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‘It would strike one unfamiliar with maritime law quite extraordinary that there should 
have grown up such an immense body of decided cases devoted to the issue 
whether owners or time charterers are parties to bills of lading contracts....’.1  
 
This comment illustrates that the proper identification of the carrier under bills of 
lading remains to be a problem, which is not resolved. 
The shipper as party to the contract of carriage however has an interest in knowing 
who the carrier is and accordingly whom to sue for loss or damage of cargo. Suing 
the wrong party may incur unnecessary costs and the possible dismissal of the civil 
action.2 Furthermore, the claimant runs the risk of becoming time barred.3  
 
The problem of the identity of the carrier usually occurs where a vessel is time 
chartered as both the charterer or the shipowner could be carrier. 
 
The problem occurs mostly where as bills of lading often do not clearly identify who 
the carrier is or may in some cases even contain contradictions as to this question.  
Furthermore, the question of the identity of the carrier may influence the place of suit 
as jurisdiction clauses often incorporated in bills of lading refer to demise and identity 
of carrier clauses.4  
 
The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, governing most of the world’s contracts of 
carriage by sea, do not offer a clear definition of the term carrier. 
 
This dissertation sets out to elaborate on the question who the carrier is under 
different jurisdictions with its underlying principles and concepts.  
                                                          
1 Colman J in Homburg Houtimport B.V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd and Others (“The Starsin”) [2000] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 89.  
2 Dabelstein p. 2; Solaguren Haftung im Seefracht und ihre gesetzliche Fortentwicklung in den 
skandinavischen Staaten 62.  
3 Pejovic The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters (2000) 31 Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce 379;  
Williams Chartering Documents 120. 
Giaschi C ‘Who is Carrier? Shipowner or Charterer’ <http://www.admiraltylaw.com/papers/Carrier.htm 
4 A jurisdiction clause may read: “Any dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be decided in the 
town and under the law, where the carrier has his principle place of business” quoted in Wodrich/Suhr 
Identity of Carrier Klausel (1976) 27 Versicherungsrecht 21. 
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Special consideration will thereby be given to the effect and validity of demise and 
identity of carrier clauses in bills of lading, which may influence the question of 
whether a bill of lading is a shipowners or a charterers bill of lading.  
 
This is especially the case where demise and identity clauses contradict the 
signature or heading of the bill of lading. In other words: where the face of the bill of 
lading purports to be a charterers bill whereas the standard clauses incorporated on 
the back of the bill aim to hold the shipowner liable as carrier under the bill of lading.  
 
It will be shown, that there is no uniform approach regarding this problem under 
international law and will comment on the necessity of bringing about changes in 




I. The identity of the carrier problem 
Cargo owners may be able to identify the flag of the vessel by obtaining a certificate 
of the ship registry from her country. It cannot however, be identified whether the ship 
is demise chartered, time chartered or voyage chartered as this is a matter of private 
contract which has to be distinguished from the carriage contract entered into by the 
cargo owner and the contractual carrier.5  
 
The Hague and Hague/Visby Rules as the most widespread convention governing 
the law of carriage by sea as well as the domestic laws of carriage of maritime 
powers such as the U.S., GB. Japan and Germany do not specifically identify the 
carrier under bills of lading. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
see for example the Canadian case of the Jian Sheng Co.Ltd. v. Great Tempo S.A. and others 
Website of the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs 
http://reports.fja.ga.ca/fc.src/shtml/1998/pub/v3/1998fc22317.shtml Reference: [1998] 3 F.C. 418. 
5 Satori ‘The Camfair’ (1993) Japan Shipping Exchange Bulletin No. 36 website of the Japan Shipping 
Exchange Inc. http://www.jseinc.org/en/buletin/bulletin36/camfair.htm.  
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1. Definition of the term “carrier” 
1.1 Hague and Hague/Visby Rules 
The Hague6 and Hague Visby Rules7 merely provide that: 
 
‘...Carrier8 includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a 
contract of carriage with a shipper....’9 
 
As the Rules merely provide that, the term “carrier” includes the owner or the 
charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper. This is not a 
particularly clear or exhaustive definition. Under this definition, the “carrier” could be 
the owner or the charterer or both10. 
 
Furthermore, bills of lading often do not identify the carrier and the Hague and Hague 
Visby Rules do not specifically define who the carrier is. 
 
1.2  Charterers and Shipowners 
The use of the word “includes” also implies that the carrier could be some other 
person or entity who is neither owner or charterer....’11 This rather broad definition of 
the term carrier which does not limit the application the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules 
to shipowners or charterers is also called the “practical”12 or “multicarrier’ approach.13 
It is uncertain however, if entities not party14 to the contract should be included in this 
                                                          
6 Adopted by the CMI in 1924 Tetley Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate 
COGSA ‘99’ (2003) 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 2 
7 Ibid 
8 Prior to the adoption of the Hague Rules in 1924 the shipowner was the dominant figure besides the 
master of the vessel. The Hague Rules first introduced the term “carrier” instead of shipowner as the 
charterer was to be given the same position. See Becker Klauseln des Seefrachtgeschäfts 181. 
9 Art. 1 (a) of the Hague Rules. See for example: 46 U.S.C. § 1301 (a), art. I (a) South African 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986.  
10 This has view has mainly been taken by American courts See: Waguespack J ‘COGSA Rules the 
Seas: Why Bailment Should Be Jettisoned in COGSA’ (2002) 1 Loyola Maritime Law Journal 103-116.  
11 Giaschi C supra, fn. 3 
12 COGSA carriers are accordingly delineated as entities being involved in transportation and engaged 
in actions that led to the loss (or damage) of cargo. Tradearbed, Inc. v. M/V Agia Sofia, 1997 AMC 
2838, 2840 (D.N.J. 1997) quoting Hyundai Corp. U.S.A. v. Hull Ins. Proceeds of the M/V Vulca, 800 F. 
Supp. 124, 132, 1993 AMC 434, 445 (D.N.J. 1992).  
13 Charest ‘A Fresh Look at the Treatment of Vessel Managers under COGSA’ (2004) 78 Tulane Law 
Review 895.  
14 It is commonly agreed among U.S. courts that an owner may be considered carrier either as party to 
the contract of carriage or indirectly by giving authority to the charterer to sign bills of lading ‘for the 
master’. Hale Container Line, Inc. v. Houston Sea Packaging Co., 137 F.3d 1455, 1464-1465 (11th 
Circuit 1998). Quoted by Charest ibid at p. 895. 
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definition.15 It may however, be fair and ‘...in keeping with the realities that ...shipper 
as plaintiffs...face in bringing a cargo claim...’ as the tangle of relationships between 
those involved may be unclear.16 
 
The term charterer also encompasses slot charterers, which merely reserve slots on 
a vessel instead of chartering a vessels entire cargo space.17  
 
1.3  Carriers other than charterer or shipowner 
As the term is not exhaustive, it could also include other entities besides the 
shipowner and/or the charterer. 
 
1.3.1 Freightforwarders/ Non Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCC’s)  
The question arises with respect to freightforwarders. Traditionally freightforwarders 
would act, as agents for the owner by arranging contracts of carriage but without 
issuing own bills of lading.18 This traditional role played by freightforwarders has 
changed considerably over the last decades.19 Nowadays they assume 
responsibilities for cargo delivery and issue bills of lading.20 The American Shipping 
Act 1984 therefore distinguishes between an ocean freightforwarder21 and a Non 
Vessel Operating Common Carrier.22 Accordingly an NVOCC issuing own bills of 
lading23 is 
                                                          
15 As against a freightforwarders it has been held that, as they only arrange for the transportation of 
cargo by securing cargo space without issuing (own) bills of lading they do not assume the role of a 
carrier see: Prima U.S. Inc v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d 126, 129, 2000 AMC 2897 (2d Cir. 2000).  
16 Charest, supra, fn. 13 at p. 895 
17 Chapman, Voyles ‘Cargo Litigation: A Primer on Cargo Claims and Review of Recent 
Developments’ (2003-2004) 16 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 5.  
18 Robertson, Sturley ‘Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ (2003) 27 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 521-522 
19 Clott, Wilson ‘Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned from Airline 
Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Transportation Law Journal 210. 
20 Robertson, Sturley, supra, fn. 18 at p. 521-522 
21 Internationally the term “freightforwarder” would not only describe an “ocean freightforwarder” in the 
American sense of the term but rather entities known as “ocean transportation intermediaries”.This 
may lead to practical difficulties where the carriage originates overseas. See: Robertson, Sturley Ibid 
at p. 523 
22 Herinafter referred to as NVOCC. 
23 The NVOCC is liable under his own bill of lading see: Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Okamoto 
Freighters Ltd., 259 F.3d 1086, 1089, 2001 AMC 2529 (9th Cir. 2001) cited in Chapman, Voyles, supra, 
fn. 17, at p. 6. 
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‘...a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the 
ocean transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with 
an ocean carrier....’24 
 
The NVOCC thus performs a double role as a (common) carrier under COGSA in 
relation to the shipper25 and as agent of the shipper as against underlying ocean 
carriers.26 Consequently a “traditional” freightforwarder merely arranging contracts of 
carriage will only be liable for his negligence and not as a COGSA carrier.27 
If one follows the “practical” approach as mentioned above, even vessel managers 
may be subject to COGSA provisions and liable as carriers as long as they take part 
in the performance of the contract of carriage.28 
 
1.3.2 The vessel in rem 
Under common law even a vessel itself may be considered to be a carrier29 and 
consequently action may be taken against the vessel in an in rem action.30 Under 
                                                          
24 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(17)(B). 
25 Ins. Co. of N. Am v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 937 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990) cited in 
Forwarderlaw.com http://www.forwarderlaw.com/cases/nvocrole.htm accessed 11th August 2004 
see also Clott, Wilson ‘Ocean Shipping Deregulation and Maritime Ports: Lessons Learned from 
Airline Deregulation’ (1999) 26 Transportation Law Journal 210 citing Stanley O. Sher & John A. 
DeVierno, Maritime Reform, American Shipper, Apr. 1984, at 11-22, at fn. 19.  
Radisch ’Die Beschränkung der Verfrachterhaftung beim Überseetransport von Containern’ 57-58;  
26 Orion Ins. Co. v. M/V “Humacao”, 851 F. Supp. 575, 577-578 (S.D.N.Y 1994);  
Kiantou-Pampouki Multimodal Transport 16-17.  
27 Weintraub & Sons, Inc. v. E.T.A. Transportation, Inc.(S.D.N.Y: 2003) (not yet officially reported) 
<http://www.onlinedmc.co.uk/weintraub_v_eta_transportation.htm> 
28 Charest, supra, fn. 13 at p. 898.  
29 According to the court in Hale Container Line, Inc. v. Houston Sea Packaging Co., 137 F.3d 1455 
(11th Circuit 1998) a vessel may is a COGSA carrier where: (1) the ship transported and discharged 
the cargo (2) the bill of lading was issued for the master (3) no contractual relationship absolving 
vessel from liability for cargo existed. see: Glenn, Marling Admiralty Law (1999) 50 Mercer Law 
Review 855.  
As soon as the vessel sails with the shippers cargo the master, representing not only the shipowner 
but also the vessel, is deemed to have ratified the contract of carriage. Pioneer Import Co. v. Lafcomo 
138 F.2d 907, 1943 AMC 1943 (2 Circuit 1943). Cited in Tetley ‘whom to sue’ Website of McGill 
University <http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/mcc4th/> 
30 Hale Container Line, Inc. v. Houston Sea Packing Co. 137 F.3d 1455, 1465, 1999 AMC 607 (11th 
Circuit 1998). Cited in Chapman, Voyles, supra, at p. 5;  
Cactus Pipe and Supply Co. v. M/V Montmartre 756 F.2d 1103, 1112, 1985 A.M.C. 2150, 2161 (5th 
Circuit 1985). See also: Schoenbaum Admiralty and Maritime Law 312; 
Waguespack, supra, fn 10, at p. 110.  
The Theory of personification has been criticised for being outdated, artificial and anomalous. See 
Davies ‘In Defense of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification’ (2000) 75 Tulane Law 
Review 338. 
Under English law suit against a vessel in rem can only be brought where the owner or demise 
charterer is held liable in personam simultaneously. Under American law the liability of the vessel in 
rem is independent of the in personam liability of the shipowner.  
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civilian jurisdictions this possibility does not exist but there will usually be a maritime 
lien for damage or loss of cargo.31 
 
Conclusion 
As shown above the term carrier is not exhaustive and it appears to be interpreted 
more extensively as courts in different jurisdictions come to acknowledge that the 
realities of the steamship era set forth in the Hague Rules are not apt to describe the 
situation of modern shipping but warrant a wider definition of the term. 
 
2. Time charters 
 
2.1 Relevance of time charters 
The risk of not being able to identify the carrier occurs especially where a vessel is 
time chartered. The time charter is a contract between the charterer and the owner 
(or disponent owner) ‘...for the exclusive use of cargo carrying spaces on board a 
ship for a fixed period of time....’32 and has to be distinguished from the contract of 
carriage between the shipper and the carrier. It is commonly acknowledged, that time 
charters are of great commercial importance in modern shipping.33  
The problem for cargo interests in case of damage or loss of cargo is that, with a 
number of parties involved in the venture, more than one person or entity may 
potentially qualify as carrier und the Rules. 
 
The commercial purpose of the time charter is the division of the duties associated 
with the carriage of goods by sea.34 As shown above the shipper and especially a 
third party to which a bill of lading is transferred will often be unaware of the 
relationship between owner and charterer and that the vessel is actually time 
chartered.35 However, even if the shipper knew the facts he would, under certain 
circumstances find it difficult to identify the carrier.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pejovic, supra, fn. 3, at p. 388.  
31 Tetley, supra, fn.29 
32 Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 588. 
33 Lorenz-Meyer Reeder und Charterer 25 
34 Pejovic, supra, fn.3 at p. 382. 
35 Ibid, at p. 380 
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2.2 The Division of the ships management 
One of the reasons for the difficulty of identifying the carrier under time charters is the 
division of the vessels management. While the shipowner retains navigational 
control, the commercial control is handed to the charterer, which means that he can 
determine the ports of call to which the shipowner is bound to proceed36  
The charterer is free to use the vessel to facilitate the transport of his own goods or  
transporting the cargo of others thereby becoming a common carrier.37  While in 
theory navigational and commercial control over a vessel may be clearly 
distinguished it proves to be difficult in practice as the two components may be 
mixed.38 It is suggested thus that both, navigational and commercial control of the 
vessel ‘...largely coincide in actual performance....’39  
It is asserted thus, that the obligation to perform the voyage is not only towards the 
charterer but also towards the shipper of the goods.40 
The division of the vessels management is one of the arguments brought forward in 
support of the notion that the carriage of goods under a time charter is effectively a 
joint venture and consequently should lead to a joint and several liability of the 
“actual” and the “performing” carrier.41 
 
3. Means of identifying the carrier 
3.1. Bills of lading 
When being faced with the necessity of identifying the carrier courts have ‘... 
traditionally looked to the bill of lading....’42 which often may be the only means of 
identifying the carrier available to the shipper. The question whether a bill of lading is 
an owners or a charterers bill has been found to be one of construction of the bill 
itself although other documents such as charterparties and other extraneous 
circumstances have partly influenced the decisions on this topic.43   
                                                          
36 Ibid, at p. 380.  
37 Ibid, at p. 380 
38 Ibid, at p.381.  
39 Ibid, at p. 381.  
40 Tetley, supra, fn. 29. 
41 Ibid  
42 Waguespack, supra, fn. 10, at p. 105.  
43 Reynolds, Treitel Carver on Bills of Lading 127-128.  
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Especially in cases where the bill of lading is subsequently endorsed to a party not 
originally party to the contract the bill of lading may often be the only document 
available in order to determine who the carrier is.44  
One of the main objects of a bill of lading is its function as a document of title against 
which letters of credit are issued. Therefore, not only the original shippers of the 
goods have but also documentary credit bankers have an interest in identifying the 
carrier. 45 
 
The identity of the carrier may be ascertained under principles of agency law. 
Therefore the signature in bills of ladings plays an important role, especially under 
common law jurisdictions. This problem however, shall not be covered in depth in this 
dissertation.  
 
3.2 Extraneous circumstances 
Some decisions have held that not only the bill of lading but also the “wider context” 
or “surrounding circumstances” such as charterparty terms may play a role in 
determining whether the bill is a charterers or a shipowners bill of lading.46 A clause 
authorising the charterer to sign bills of lading on the masters behalf may well ‘... 
suggest that the shipowner was intended to be the carrier....’.47  
 
There is no doubt that where the relevant terms are incorporated into the bill of lading 
it will be legitimate to take recourse to them in order to identify the carrier.48  
Where these terms are not expressly incorporated into the bill of lading this seems 
less certain and usually the surrounding circumstances will usually be given less 
weight.49  
 
It thus seems fair, to determine this question by merely referring to the bill of lading 
as cargo interest, in general, cannot be required to scrutinise the underlying 
                                                          
44 Poetschke Die Haftung des Reeders für Ansprüche aus Konnossementen unter einer Zeitchartere 
nach deutschem und englischem Recht 26. 
45 Richardson The Hague and Hague Visby Rules 16. 
46 Reynolds, supra, fn. 43, at p. 137.  
47 Bassindale The Identity of the Carrier under Bills of Lading (1992) 11 Clifford Chance Maritime 
Review 5 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid at p. 7 
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relationship of shipowner and charterer, especially in cases where the bill of lading 
was transferred and they are unaware of its terms.50 
 
The terms should therefore be irrelevant, as the construction would ‘... run counter to 
the policy of keeping the doctrine of constructive notice out of commercial affairs....’51  
 
3.3 Other terms of the bill of lading  
3.3.1 demise clause 
A standard clause which may have an impact on the identification of the carrier is the 
demise clause, frequently incorporated in bills of lading. Its effect and validity are 
disputed.  
 
3.3.1.1 History and Origin 
The demise has its origin in the U.S. law of carriage where the clause surfaced as a 
bills of lading clause without carrying the name/being known as “demise clause” 
during World War II.52 Its standard text reads: 
 
“Limitation of Liability: The Carrier shall be entitled to the full benefit of, 
and right to, all limitations of, or exemptions from, liability authorized by 
any provisions of sections 4281 to 4286 of the Revised Statues of the 
United States and amendments thereto and of any other provisions of the 
laws of the United States or of any other country whose laws shall apply. 
If the ship is not owned by or chartered by demise to the War Shipping 
Administration or the Company designated herein (as may be the case 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary) this Bill of Lading shall take 
effect only as a contract with the owner or demise charterer, as the case 
may be, as principal, through the agency of the (War Shipping 
Administration) or the Company designated herein which acts as agent 
only and shall be under no personal liability whatsoever in respect 
thereof. If, however, it shall be adjudged that any other than the owner or 
                                                          
50 Where the charterparty contains clauses identifying the carrier and it can be proven that the holder 
of the bill of lading was fully aware of the said terms, it may be possible to take them into account. See 
Bassindale 5; 
The terms of the charterparty may however, be given effect as between the owner and the charterer. 
See: Schoenbaum, supra, fn. 30 at p. 314. 
51 This policy was stated in Manchester Trust Ltd. v. Furness Withy & Co. 1895 2 Q.B. 
52 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 5 
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demise charterer is carrier and exonerations from liability provided by law 
or by the terms hereof shall be available to such others”.53 
 
The first part of the clause is concerned with the carriers limitation of liability who 
shall be entitled to limit his liability according to §§ 4281 to 4286 of the Revised 
Statutes of the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act. As these provisions would be 
enforceable in any case the first part of the clause may seem to be obsolete.54 
The second part of the clause could explain the first part in stating that if the vessel is 
not owned or chartered by demise to the War Shipping Administration or the 
company designated in the bill of lading only the demise charterer or owner of the 
vessel shall be held liable as carrier. In this case the (demise) clause declares the bill 
of lading to be the contract of carriage with the shipowner or demise charterer 
represented by the War Shipping Agency or the Company issuing the bill of lading as 
agents only.  
It therefore is clear, that the issuer of the bill of lading does not want to be held liable 
as carrier if the vessel is not owned or demise chartered by him. As the issuer of the 
bill of lading may either have been the War Shipping Administration or a company the 
effect of the demise clause on both shall be briefly scrutinised for this purpose.  
 
3.3.1.2 The War Shipping Administration 
The War Shipping Administration was established during the second world war. 
During this period the U.S. built a huge fleet of commercial vessels to facilitate its 
transports and supplies.55 This fleet was operated by the War Shipping 
Administration. 
 
3.3.1.2.1 The War Shipping Administration as shipowner 
Formally officers and crews of these vessels were under the command of the War 
Shipping Administration in practice the duties were performed by private companies 
which were obligated as against the government by general agency agreements.56 
The government therefore retained all rights as owner of the vessels. The bills of 
ladings however, were signed and issued by the private companies. 
                                                          
53 Schaps, Abraham Das Seerecht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 753. 
54 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 2, at p. 9 
55 Herber Seehandelsrecht 293.  
56 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 2 at p. 10 
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The demise clause therefore aims specifically at limiting the liability of the carrier. It is 
questionable however, whether this was the War Shipping Administration or the 
companies performing the carriage.  
One could conclude that the demise clause was in favour of the shipping companies 
issuing the bills of lading. It can be presumed, however, that the U.S. government did 
not want to be held liable as carrier. The first part of the demise clause therefore has 
to be seen as protecting the companies.57 
 
3.3.1.2.2 The War Shipping Administration as charterer 
As the own vessels could not sufficiently cover the demand for tonnage the U.S. 
government simultaneously chartered vessels instead of requisitioning them. The 
vessels were either time or demise chartered. The shipowners however, retained 
navigational as well as commercial control over the vessel.  
In France on the other hand shipowners were compelled to charter their vessels to 
the state. While the shipowners retained control a bill of lading clause declared them 
to act as agents.58 
In French decisions courts took the view that the state was to be held liable.59 
 
3.3.1.2.3 Interest in the demise clause 
As opposed to France the (demise) clause in the U.S. bills of ladings attempted to 
construct a reverse representation due to the different nature of interests involved. 
The (demise) clause aimed at shifting liability from the War Shipping Agency or its 
agents on the shipowners or demise charterers.60 The reason was that the War 
Shipping Agency as charterer could not rely on §§ 4281 to 4286 of the Revised 
Statute which would have meant that the War Shipping Agency would have been 
unable to limit liability.61 
Interestingly the Supreme Court of the U.S. held that, the War Shipping 
Administration was to be seen as shipowner or demise charterer in respect of the 
entire fleet, as the state was at all material times employer of the officers and 
crews.62 
                                                          
57 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 2, at p. 11 
58 Sotiropoulos Die Beschränkung der Reederhaftung 110.  
59 Cases quoted in Sotiropoulos Die Beschränkung der Reederhaftung 110.  
60 Becker, surpra, fn. 8 at p. 183.  
61 Herber, supra, fn. 55 at p. 293 
62 Sotiropoulos, supra, fn. 58, refering to Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Mc Allister, 1949, 337 U.S. 783 
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Even where the ships were time chartered the War Shipping Administration was to 
be considered demise charterer for this purpose with the effect of a limited liability 
under § 4286 of the Revised Statute.  
It may be concluded thus that the U.S government was liable at all times but on the 
other hand never at risk of unlimited liability. 
 
3.3.1.3 The National Shipping Authority 
The successor of the War Shipping Administration was the National Shipping 
Authority, founded in 1951.63 It continued the chartering of its vessels by private 
companies on the basis of general agency agreements and an unaltered version of 
the demise clause in their bills of ladings.64 Through the continuing usage of their bills 
of ladings the (demise) clause surfaced in the transport of private Lines. U.S. time 
charterers compared their role to the War Shipping Administration and saw 
advantages in taking over the demise clause in their own bills of lading.65  
This practice was soon copied by foreign charterers and a number of different 
alternations of demise clauses although not always named demise clause appeared 
in bills of lading.66  
 
3.3.2 Identity of carrier clause 
Another clause commonly found in bills of lading is the identity of carrier clause. It 
can be said, that the identity of carrier clause is not only related to the demise clause 
but rather a variation of the same clause.67  
It commonly reads as follows:  
 
“The contract evidenced by this Bill of Lading is between the Merchant and 
the owner of the vessel named herein (or substitute) and it is therefore 
agreed that said shipowner only shall be liable for any damage or loss due 
to any breach or non-performance of any obligation arising out of the 
contract of carriage, whether or not relating to the vessel’s seaworthiness. 
If, despite the foregoing, it is adjudged that any other is the carrier and/or 
                                                          
63 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 2, at p. 18 
64 Sotiropoulos, supra, fn. 58, at p. 210. 
65 Dabelstein, supra, fn. 2, at p. 18 
66 Ibid at p. 19. 
67 Schaps, Abraham, supra, fn. 53, at p. 753;  
Wodrich/Suhr, supra, fn. 4, at p. 21 
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bailee of the goods shipped hereunder, al limitations of, and exonerations 
from liability provided by law or by this Bill of Lading shall be available to 
such other. It is further understood and agreed that as the Line, Company 
or Agents who has executed this Bill of Lading for and on behalf of the 
Master is not a principal in the transaction, said Line, Company or Agents 
shall not be under any liability arising out of the contract of carriage nor as 
Carrier nor bailee of the goods”.68  
 
According to this clause the contract evidenced by the bill of lading is between the 
merchant and the owner of the said vessel, which in turn means that only he shall be 
liable for any occurring damages or loss. The shipowner would then invoke the right 
to limit his liability and thereafter be indemnified by the charterer who would thus 
enjoy the benefits of limited liability.69 Although the aim of the demise and the identity 
clause are the same they differ in a number of points:  
Amongst others the identity of carrier clause does not list the shipowner and the 
demise charterer alternatively but only the shipowner as party to the contract. The bill 
of lading itself is not seen as being the contract of carriage but rather evidencing a 
contract of carriage.  
 
3.3.3 The validity of the demise and identity of carrier clause 
After the ratification of the Convention for limitation of liability, 1957, the demise 
clause as well as the identity of carrier clause became obsolete70 as under art. 6 sec. 
2 of the Convention the possibility to limit liability was extended to parties of the 
contract other than the shipowner.71 Art 6 (2) of the Convention reads: 
 
‘...Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, the provisions of this Convention 
shall apply to the charterer, manager and operator of the ship, and to the 
Master members of the crew and other servants of the owner, charterer, 
                                                          
68 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44 at p. 42 
69 Pejovic ‘The Problem of the Validity of Identity of Carrier Clauses’ (1995) 30 European Transport 
Law 300  
70 Becker, supra, fn. 8, at p. 184; 
Puttfarken Seehandelsrecht 42; 
Sotiropoulos, supra, fn. 58, at p. 361. 
71 Schwörbel Die Beschränkung der Reederhaftung nach dem Brüsseler Abkommen vom 10.10.1957 
at p.47; Puttfarken Beschraenkte Reederhaftung – Das anwendbare Recht 10;  
Hoffmann Die Haftung des Verfrachters nach deutschem Seefrachtrecht 64.  
In Germany the convention entered into force in 1972. See: Poetschke, supra, fn. 44, at p. 43. 
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manager or operator acting the course of their employment, in the same 
way as they apply to an owner himself....’72 
 
In Germany the convention came into force in 1972.73 Interestingly, German courts 
even prior to the enactment of the convention by virtue of the German Commercial 
Code held that charterers could limit their liability.74  
The clause however, remains in use75 although consequently the original purpose of 
the clause only continues to exist in jurisdictions where the Convention has not been 
enacted.76  
 
3.3.4 General position on the effect and validity of demise and identity of 
carrier clauses 
The fact that demise and identity of carrier clauses are obsolete has to be 
distinguished from the question whether they are valid stipulations. Nowadays the 
demise and identity of carrier clause are used to construct a contractual relationship 
between the shipowner and the shipper.77 
The main arguments brought forward against the validity of the clauses are that they 
are ineffective either under common law principles or as in some Canadian 
decisions78 under Art. III (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules, as they purports to lessen or 
probably avoid liability79  of the carrier.80  
                                                          
72 The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 further extended the possibility to 
limit to persons and entities such as Salvors, art. 1 (3). See Bundesgesetzblatt 1986 II, p. 786. 
73 Gesetz zur Aenderung des HGB und anderer Gesetze vom 21.06.1972. 
74 OLG Hamburg judgement delivered on 13.3.1969 (6 U 149/68) cited in (1969) 20 
Versicherungsrecht 662; 
In an obiter dictum the same court ruled that, if this became the prevailing view that charterers could 
limit their liability in analogy to the shipowner, identity of carrier clauses became obsolete. See: OLG 
Hamburg judgement delivered on 22.5.1969 (6 U 59/68) cited in (1970) 21 Versicherungsrecht 80. 
The decision was subsequently upheld by the German Supreme Court (BGH) Urteil des BGH vom 
28.6.1971 [Revisionsentscheidung zu dem in Versicherungsrecht 69, 660 abgedr. Urteil des OLG 
Hamburg v. 13.3.1969 (6 U 149/68)] cited in (1971) 22 Versicherungsrecht 833.  
75 F.M.B.R. ‘The Demise Clause and The Hague Rules’ (1987) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 260; Herber Seehandelsrecht Systematische Darstellung 244. 
76 Pejovic, supra, fn. 69, at p. 300  
In Germany this was the case until 1972. As the charterer could not limit his liability under the German 
Commercial Code. See: Herber, supra, fn. 55, at p. 244. 
77 Solaguren, supra, fn. 2, at p. 61.  
78 Carling O’Keefe of Canada Ltd. v. C.N. Marine Inc. (The Newfoundland Coast) [1990] 1 F.C. 483. 
see also Canficorp v. Cormorant Bulk-Carriers 1985 A.M.C. 1444 (Fed. C.A.).  
79 Prüssmann, Rabe Seehandelsrecht 615;  
Dubischar Grundriss des gesamten Gütertransportrechts 143. 
80 Reynolds F.M.B. ‘The Demise Clause’ (1988) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 285 
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It is asserted that principles of the law of agency are inapplicable due to the concept 
of a time charter as a joint venture between shipowner and charterer.81 
 
Further reasons against the validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses will be 
addressed below. 
 
The main arguments brought forward for the validity of these clauses is that they only 
identify the carrier instead of purporting to lessen the carrier’s liability. The New 
South Wales Court of Appeal for example took this view.82 
 
As will be shown below there have been contrasting approaches and it cannot be 
convincingly stated that even under the same jurisdiction this problem is solved in a 
uniform manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The bill of lading will usually be the only document available to the consignee to 
identify the carrier. It thus seems fair to conclude that extraneous circumstances and 
terms not expressly incorporated in the bill of lading should generally not be 
determinative on the question of the identity of the carrier.  
We can conclude that demise and identity of carrier clauses are obsolete nowadays 
although they remain in use. 





I. The Identity of the carrier problem under different jurisdictions  
1. Common Law Jurisdictions 
1.1 The United States of America 
1.1.1 Applicable Law 
In the U.S. the law of carriage is governed by U.S. COGSA83 incorporating the Hague 
Rules including the Visby amendments of 1968 which entered into force in 1977 and 
the Harter Act, 1893.  
                                                          
81 Tetley, supra, fn. 29 
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COGSA applies to ‘...all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the 
United States in foreign trade....’.84 This requires that the carriage is performed under 
a bill of lading or a similar document of title.85  
The Harter Act governs the carriage of goods by sea between U.S. ports as well as 
inland water carriage under bills of lading.86 As opposed to the Hague-Visby Rules 
which only cover the period from tackle to tackle the Harter Act applies ‘...from the 
time of discharge to the time of delivery....’87 Neither of both acts providing rules for 
the carriage of goods by sea clearly identifies the carrier. 
 
1.1.2 General position on the identity of carrier problem 
American decisions on this topic have been rather inconsistent. As opposed to the 
general position in England American courts have held that there may be more than 
one carrier under COGSA88 including entities other than shipowner or charterer.89  
 
The notion of a joint and several liability also has been expressed by American courts 
and authorities. In Joo Seng Hong Kong Co., Ltd v. S.S. Unibulkfir the court ruled 
that there is a  
 
‘...strong statutory support for treating, except in exceptional situations, all 
owners and charterers involved in the carriage of goods at issue as 
COGSA carriers who are potentially liable to cargo interests under the bill 
of lading....’90  
 
Consequently the loss would then be apportioned among the parties found to be 
carriers under COGSA.91  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
82 Kaleej International Pty Ltd. v. Gulf Shipping Lines Ltd.(1986) 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 
83 The U.S. COGSA was adopted in 1936. See: Waguespack ‘COGSA Rules the Seas: Why Bailment 
Should be Jettisoned in COGSA Actions’ (2002) 1 Loyola Martime Law Journal 103.  
84 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312  
85 46 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (b)  
86 Chapman, Voyles, supra, fn. 17, at p. 14. 
87 Crowley Am. Transp., Inc. v. Richard Sewing Mach. Co., 172 F.3d 781, 785 n.6, 1999 AMC 1723 
(11th Circuit 1999) cited in Chapman, Voyles, supra, fn. 17, at p. 14. 
88 Waguespack, supra, fn. 10, at p. 108. 
89 This “multicarrier approach“ going even beyond the notion of joint liability, has been adopted mainly 
by the Southern District Court of New York. It has to be noted however, that this view has not been 
endorsed by the U.S. Courts of Appeal as yet See: Reilly ‘Charter Party Symposium: Identity of The 
Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters’ (2001) 25 The Maritime Lawyer 509.  
90 Joo Seng Hong Kong Co., Ltd. v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F.Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y.1979) quoted in 
Schoenbaum Admiralty and Maritime Law 313. 
91 Ibid at 313. 
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1.1.3 The demise and identity of carrier clauses under American Law 
The clauses have been held both, valid or invalid stipulations by different American 
courts. 
The prevailing view on the validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses however 
is that, as a matter of public policy, they are unenforceable under American law.92 
 
In Complaint of Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd.93 the plaintiff cargo owners sued the 
vessel, its owner and charterers for damage to the cargo. The goods were shipped 
under charterers bills of lading and contained a demise clause. The charterer invoked 
the demise clause thereby trying to avoid liability as carrier. In an obiter dictum the 
court held, that it had found no ‘...circuit authority....’invalidating a demise clause.94 
 
In Yeramex International v. S.S. Tendo95 cargo was shipped under bills of lading 
containing a reverse identity of carrier clause which declared the charterer to be the 
carrier. The court held that the charterer was liable as a carrier. The decision was 
based on the fact that the terms of identity of carrier clause were clear but mainly that 
he assumed carriers responsibilities with regard to the issuance of the bill of lading 
as well as the handling of the cargo. 
It is asserted that this decision is of little or no authority for the question concerned as 
it was a reverse clause and its validity was not argued. Furthermore the decision was 
to a great extent founded on the construction of the surrounding circumstances such 
as the charterparty, not so much however, on the bill of lading.96 
 
Other American decisions have been less favourable of demise clauses.  
 
In Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Yerakas97 the court held a demise clause to be an 
attempt to lessen the carriers liabitliy under U.S. COGSA. It was therefore considered 
to be an invalid stipulation.98 
                                                          
92 Pejovic, supra, fn. 3, at p. 387. 
93 Complaint of Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd. v. Peoples Insurance of China 903 F.2d 675, 682, 1990 
AMC 1544 (9. Circuit 1990).  
94 Complaint of Damodar Bulk Carriers, Ltd. Cited in Tetley, supra, fn. 29 
95 Yeramex International v. S.S. Tendo 595 F.2d 947-948, 1979 AMC 1282 (4th Circuit 1979).  
96 Tetley ‘The Demise of the Demise Clause?’ at p. 815. 
97 Thyssen Steel v. M/V Kavo Yerakas 50 F.3d 1349 at 1353, 1995 AMC 2317 at 2322 (5th Circuit 
1995). 
98 Tetley, supra, fn. 29 
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Conclusion 
It appears that the situation concerning the effect and validity of demise clauses is 
not handled in uniform way by the various courts. The tendency seems to be that 
courts refute the effectiveness and validity of these clauses. 
 
1.2  Great Britain 
1.2.1 Applicable law 
The English law of carriage is governed by the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.99 The 
Hague Visby Rules were enacted into English law in 1971 by virtue of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act 1971. 
 
Under English law, the both, the signature as well as demise and identity of carrier 
clauses including appendices plays an important role play an equally important role 
in identifying the carrier. 
 
As a principle under English law, the bill of lading is seen as an ‘owner’s bill of lading’ 
as opposed to German law where as a general rule the bill of lading is perceived to 
be a carriers bill of lading.100 The ship and its owner are therefore more prominent 
under common law jurisdictions. The master of the vessel is seen as servant of the 
owner. His signature plays an important role in determining who the carrier is.101 As a 
general customary rule under English common law the master signs bills of ladings 
for the owner. Equally bills of ladings signed by the charterer as authorised by the 
master will usually bind the shipowner.102 
The identity of the carrier is influenced by the strong link between the carriage 
contract and the bill of lading under English law.103 In identifying the carrier the 
question of who is obligated to perform the carriage is of less importance than the 
question of who issued the bill of lading.104 The signature on the bill of lading 
therefore plays a more significant role under English law as opposed to German 
law.105  
                                                          
99 Ibid 
100 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44, at p.134. 
101 Ibid 
102 Boyd et al Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 80. 
103 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44, at p 134. 
104 Ibid, at p 135. 
105 Ibid, at p 154. 
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1.2.2 General position under English law 
Under English law, there traditionally been no objections against the validity of the 
identity of carrier clause.106 The identity of carrier clause is seen as a means of 
identifying the carrier rather than discharging the charterer from liability thereby 
eliminating any ambiguity.107 
The clause highlights the fact that the vessel may be on charter and the owner in this 
case possibly be party to the contract of carriage with the charterer assuming the role 
of the owners agent.108  
In English law as under German law the clause is assessed by the principles of 
agency law. The question is whether the issuer of the bill of lading acts with authority 
and obviousness. The authority of the charterer to sign bills of lading for the 
shipowner will usually derive from an employment clause frequently contained in the 
charter party.109. Under English law the employment clause encompasses the right to 
sign bills of ladings containing identity of carrier clauses110 Where the charterer signs 
bills of lading containing an identity of carrier clause without authority the owner will 
not be bound.111  
 
1.2.3 English cases 
• The Berkshire  
In the Berkshire the plaintiff shippers sued the owners of the vessel 
Lancashire for damages.112 The vessel was at all material times on time charter.113 A 
bill of lading which contained a demise clause was issued on the charterers agents 
printed form and signed by the sub-agents of the charterer.114 The shippers 
contended that the owner was liable for the damages as carrier while the owner 
asserted that the contract of carriage was between the charterers and the 
shippers.115 The court had to decide firstly, whether the contract as ‘...evidenced by 
the bill of lading was a contract between the shippers and the shipowners....’ and 
                                                          
106 Prüssmann/Rabe Seehandelsrecht 617.  
107 See the Australian decision in Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines Ltd (1986) 6 New 
South Wales Law Reports 574 (The Sun Diamond Voyage 19).  
108 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44, at p 161. 
109 Trappe Zur Frage der Zeichnung der Konnossemente unter einer Zeitcharter (1972) 20 
Versicherungsrecht 520.  
110 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyds Rep.183. 
111 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44 at p. 162.  
112 Ibid 
113 Ibid 
l114 Ibid  
115 Ibid 
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secondly, if so, whether the charterer and his sub-charterer were authorised to issue 
the bill of lading on the shipowners behalf. 116  
The court firstly gave effect to the demise clause and held, that the bill of lading 
intended to evidence a contract between the shipper and the shipowner.117 The 
express wording of the clause clearly was said to encompass the agent charterer in 
whose name the sub-agent signed the bill of lading.118 Furthermore it was 
undisputed, that the vessel was not owned or demise chartered to the said company, 
but by the shipowners.119 On the fist point the judge therefore held, that ‘...the 
contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading purports to be a contract 
between the shippers and the shipowner and not one between the shippers and the 
charterers....’.120 
The second question was also answered in the affirmative. The court held, that the 
effect of demise clauses in bills of ladings are ‘...well settled....’ and not extraordinary 
as it merely spells out that the bill of lading is intended to be a shipowners bill of 
lading in unequivocal terms and therefore has to be seen as ‘...entirely usual and 
ordinary....’ in this context121 As the clause was not extraordinary the charterers had 
authority to sign the bill of lading containing a demise clause by virtue of the 
employment clause (clause 8) of the charterparty.122 They were furthermore entitled 
to appoint sub-agents to sign on their behalf.123 The shipper therefore had title to sue 
the shipowner upon the bill of lading contract evidenced by the bill of lading.  
It has been noted however, that the words ‘and not between the shippers and the 
charterers’ were obiter dictum as only the shipowner was sued124  
It is argued, that the charterer could as well have been sued by the consignees as he 
had issued the bills of lading and the judgement merely spelled out that the 
shipowner was liable under a charterers bill by virtue of the Bills of Lading Act, 
1855.125 The Berkshire however remains to be one of the main authorities on the 
validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses.126 
 
                                                          
116 Ibid, at p. 187. 
117 Ibid, at p. 188. 
 





124 Tetley ‘The Demise of the Demise Clause?’ (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 819.  
125 Ibid  
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• The Venezuela  
In The Venezuela127 the bill of lading was the charterers usual form and signed 
by the charterers agents ‘as agents for the master. The vessel was at all material 
times on time charter. The bill of lading contained an identity of carrier clause which 
provided that either the charter (C.A.V.N.) or the sub-charterer (F.M.G.) depending 
on who was operating the vessel at the material time was to be regarded carrier.128 In 
any case the owner of the vessel should not be held liable under the contract 
evidenced by the bill of lading. The identity of carrier clause was therefore rather 
unusual. The court held the time charterer (C.A.V.N.) to be the carrier under the bill 
of lading. Although the court found that the bill of lading was a shipowners bill of 
lading due to the fact that it had been signed for the master, it was held, that effect 
had to be given to the identity of carrier clause, meaning that only the charter or the 
sub-charterer and no other company could be regarded as carrier under the bill of 
lading.129 As there was no indication on either side of the bill of lading that another 
company was carrier under the bill of lading the charterer had to be regarded as 
“contracting carrier”.130 The identity of carrier clause was therefore held to be valid 
and effective.  
 
• The Rewia  
In The Rewia it was held, that “a bill of lading signed for the master cannot be 
a charterers bill unless the contract was made with the charterers alone, and the 
person signing has authority to sign and does sign, on behalf of the charterers not 
the owners....’131  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
126 Ibid 
127 The Venezuela [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 393. 
128 The clause reads as follows: ‘Carrier...is...Comapania Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion or the 
Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana S.A. depending on whichever of the two is operating the vessel 
carrying the goods covered by the Bill of Lading....’., Ibid 
129 Ibid, at p. 397.  
130 Ibid  
131 The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 333. C.A.;  
Boyd et al. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 81.  
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The Ines  
In the Ines132 the vessel was on time charter to charterers operating a liner 
service under the name of Maras Linja. Bills of ladings were issued on the form of the 
charterer and were ‘...signed as agents for the carrier Maras Linja...’.133 The bills of 
lading contained inter alia a (demise clause cl. 19).134 The issue again was whether 
the bills were owners or charterers bills. The signature itself was ambiguous as it 
named the charterer as carrier. The court however was of the opinion that it was right 
to examine the bill of lading as a whole and also to consider the whole contractual 
context.135. Relying on the judgement in The Berkshire Clarke J gave effect to the 
demise clause.136 It was held that, as a matter of construction the bill had to be 
regarded as an owners bills of lading.137 The consideration of the whole context did 
not lead to a different result.138. The owner was therefore considered carrier. While 
the court gave effect to the demise clause, it did not comment on the its validity. It 
does not seem far fetched to assume however, that the same result would also have 
been reached in the absence of the demise clause as it was only one of the 
indicators on which the court relied in holding that the bills were owners bills of 
lading.  
Commenting on this case Prof Tetley concluded that it was only an obiter dictum and 
should therefore not be recognized.139 
 
• The Flecha  
In The Flecha the cargo owners sued the owners of the vessel for damages.140 
The vessel was at all material times on time charter to Continental Pacific Shipping 
Ltd and bills of ladings were issued on the charterers form containing inter alia an 
identity of carrier clause (cl. 33) and a demise clause (cl. 35).141 The bills of ladings 
were signed by different agents for Continental Pacific Shipping as carrier.142 The bill 
of lading owners sued the owner of the vessel for damages. The court had to answer 
                                                          
132 M.B. Pyramid Sound N.V. v. Briese Schiffahrts GmbH and Co. KG. M.S. “Sina”and Latvian 
Shipping Association Ltd. (The “Ines”), [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144. 
133 Ibid, at p. 149. 
134 Ibid, at p. 145. 
135 Ibid, at p. 150.  
136 Ibid, at p. 149. 
137 Ibid, at p. 150. 
138 Ibid  
139 Tetley, supra, fn. 124, at p 820. 
140 Fetim B.V. and Others v. Oceanspeed Shipping Ltd. (“The Flecha” ), [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. 612. 
141 Ibid 
142 Ibid, at p. 614.  
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the question whether the bills of ladings were owners or charterers bills.143 While 
taken by themselves the signatures on the bills may indicate that the charterers 
(Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd) were contractual carriers Mr. Justice Clark held as 
in The Ines the whole contract had to be looked at in a wider context and not limited 
to the construction of the bill alone.144. Under the charter party the charterers had the 
right to sign bills of ladings on behalf of the owner, which meant that the owners 
would be bound by the signature of the charterers and that this also reflected in the 
bill of lading terms namely in encompassed in the demise and identity of carrier 
clause.145 To identify the charterer as carrier would require a ‘...positive indication 
that the charterers are undertaking a personal liability in contradiction to that which 
appears from these various forms of signature....’.146 The court did not find the 
signatures loosely describing Continental Pacific Shipping as carrier to go ‘...far 
enough to make it clear that the parties intended...them to be...contracting in place of 
the owners contrary to all the terms of the bill of lading....’.147 The loose usage of the 
terms “carrier” was thus held to be insufficient to ‘...displace the clear terms of the bill 
of lading....’148 The court therefore held, that upon examination of the document as a 
whole the owners were carriers as the signatures did not constitute a clear intention 
to the contrary.149 
 
• The Hector 
In the Hector the vessel was time chartered to US Express Lines (“USEL”).150 
The charterparty provided inter alia ‘...master to authorise charterers...to sign bills of 
lading on their behalf in conformity with mates receipt....’151 Subsequently, the vessel 
was sub chartered to the defendants Uvisco. The bill was signed “for and on behalf of 
the owner”and on the face appeared the typed words “CARRIER: U.S. EXPRESS 
LINES”.152 The bill of lading contained an identity of carrier clause on the reverse 
                                                          
143 Ibid, at p. 612.  
144 The Flecha, supra, fn. 140, at p. 618. 
The Ines, supra, fn. 132, at p. 150 
145 The Flecha, supra, fn. 140, at p. 618. 
146 The Flecha, supra, fn. 140 at p. 618/619. 
147 Ibid  
148 Ibid, at p. 619. 
149 Ibid 
150 Sunrise Maritime Inc. v. Uvisco Ltd. (The “Hector”), [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287. 
151 Ibid 
152 Ibid, at p.. 290.  
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which identified the owner as carrier.153 The court had to decide inter alia whether the 
bill of lading was an owner’s or s charterer’s bill of lading.154 Relying on the 
authorities Justice Rix found it difficult to determine whether the identification of the 
carrier was to be ascertained merely by construction of the bill of lading or depended 
on ‘...all the circumstances of the case....’.155 As negotiable documents bills of ladings 
may be relied on by third parties not privy to the contract of carriage and therefore 
ignorant of the original circumstances.156 Justice Rix adopted the approach of Justice 
Clark by first construing the bill of lading and subsequently considering whether or 
not the ‘...surrounding circumstances support or detract from that conclusion....’.157 
 
It appears that the judgement of The Hector is only the second decision where a bill 
of lading was signed for the master and yet the charterer was held to be the carrier. 
158 It furthermore is the first case where a bill containing an identity of carrier clause 
was held to be a charterer’s bill.159 Upon construction of the bill Mr. Justice Rix held, 
that the fact that USEL is stipulated to be the carrier is not ambiguous. The term 
‘carrier’ has to be understood as a technical term in this context not merely indicating 
that USEL was operating the vessel but rather that USEL was the company actually 
carrying out the obligation set forth by the contract of carriage as evidenced by the 
bill of lading.160 Furthermore the bill of lading was subject to the Hague Rules which 
define carrier as including the owner as well as the charterer.161 The only party 
expressly identified by name is USEL as carrier. Cl. 17 stipulates that the owner is 
carrier. Upon pure construction of the bill of lading it therefore appears that USEL are 
both owners and carriers.162 Mr. Justice Rix came to the conclusion that either the 
‘...USEL stipulation, the signature and cl. 17 – can be regarded as consistent with 
one another....’ meaning that they are both owners and carriers or that the typed 
stipulation of USEL as carrier supersedes cl. 17 on the reverse of the bill.163  
                                                          
153 Waldron ‘Owners or charterer’s bill of lading? The mystery deepens’ (1999) Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 1. 
154 The Hector, supra, fn. 150, at p. 287. 
155 Ibid, at. p. 293.  
156 Ibid  
157 Ibid, at p. 294.  
158 Waldron, supra, fn. 153, at p. 2. 
159 Ibid. 
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Mr. Justice Rix furthermore held that even under consideration of the wider context it 
had to be concluded that the contract was between Uvisco and USEL as carrier.164  
It has to be noted that the court did not give effect to the identity of carrier clause 
without commenting on its validity. It furthermore has been remarked that the 
decision does not contemplate the possibility of both, the charterer and the 
shipowner being carrier under the bill of lading with the effect of joint and several 
liability.165 
 
• The Starsin  
In The Starsin the vessel was time chartered to the defendants Continental Pacific 
Shipping Ltd.166 Under Bills of Ladings consignments of timber and plywood were 
shipped from Malaysia for discharge at Antwerp and Avonmouth.167 The bills of 
lading were liner bills on the form of Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd. Under cl. 1 
“carrier” was defined ‘...as the party on whose behalf the bill of lading was signed. All 
bills were signed by agents for ‘Continental Pacific Shipping as carrier....’.168 The bill 
of lading contained an identity of carrier clause (cl. 33)169 and a demise clause (cl. 
35).170 Upon discharge the bills of lading holders sued the shipowners under the bills 
of lading contract.171 One of the main issues in this case was inter alia whether the 
bills were charterers or owners bills of ladings.  
 
Although Mr. Justice Colman asserted that the demise clause has become 
unnecessary since the enactment of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims, 1976 by s. 186 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1995 he did not 
question its validity in this context.172 With regard to the identity of carrier and demise 
clause the court relied on the judgements in The Flecha and The Ines thereby 
                                                          
164 Ibid, at p. 295.  
165 Tetley ‘The Demise of the Demise Clause’ (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 821 
 
166 Homburg Houtimport B. V. v. Agrosin Private Ltd. and others (The “Starsin”) (2000) 1 Lloyd’s Law 
Report 85 Q.B.  
167 Buckley ‘The Starsin [2003] 3 Shipping and Trade Law 1. 
168 The Starsin, supra, fn. 166, at p.85.  
169 The identity of carrier clause is in common form The Starsin C.A. 466.  
170 The (restated) demise clause reads as follows: ‘35. If the Ocean vessel is not owned by or 
chartered by demise to the company or line by whom this Bill of Lading is issued (as may be the case 
notwithstanding anything that appeared to the contrary) this Bill of Lading shall take effect only as a 
contract of carriage with the owner or demise charterer as the case may be as principal made through 
the agency of the said company or line who act solely as agent and shall be under no personal liability 
whatsoever in respect thereof.’ Cited in Homburg Houtimport v Agrosin [2001] 1 All ER 467.  
171 The Starsin, supra, fn. 166 at p. 85. 
172 Ibid, at p. 89.  
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holding that the clear indication that the shipowner is the carrier could only be 
displaced in case the additional writing clearly showed that the charterer assumed 
‘...the obligations of carriage under that contract....’173 
The question therefore was whether the content in the signature box describing 
Continental Pacific Shipping Ltd as “the carrier” or “as Carrier” would supersede the 
printed terms of the identity of carrier and the demise clause.174 In order to ascertain 
who the carrier was Mr. Justice Colman saw no reason to depart from the approach 
of the authorities in The Ines and The Rewia according to which it was necessary to 
consider the wider contractual context.175  
Firstly however the judge looked at the express wording of the bill thereby construing 
the document as a whole.176 If as in this case liner bills of ladings are issued it is 
certain that only the issuer of the bill and the shipper are involved thus the shipper 
can be expected to know that the charterer may have authority to bind the 
shipowner.177 The court would only resort to a further investigation of the wider 
context where the construction of the bill holds the shipowner to be undertaking the 
carriage of goods especially where the authorization of the charterer by the 
shipowner is an issue.178  
In this case the carrier is understood to be ‘...the party on whose behalf this Bill of 
Lading has been signed....’ which does not ascertain whether this is the owner or the 
charterer.179 In any case it would be understood to be the person responsible for the 
carriage.180 The second sentence in the identity of carrier clause however spells out 
that this may not be the owner.181 This would be the case where there was 
something contradicting written on the face of the bill.182 In marked contrast to the 
judgement in The Flecha the House of Lords held that the term “carrier” had an 
obvious meaning and was not loosely used to describe a liner company and 
therefore to vague and uncertain as to displace clause 33 and 35.183 Colman J 
therefore agreed with the judgement of Rix J in The Hector where the bills of lading 
                                                          
173 Ibid, at p.. 90.  
174 Ibid  
175 The Ines, supra, fn. 131, at p. 149-150; The Rewia, supra, fn. 132, at p. 333. 
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were held to be charterers bills and therefore not binding on the shipowner. The court 
did not however hold the demise and identity of carrier clauses to be invalid.  
 
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Colman J in part with Rix LJ 
dissenting.184 
As a general rule under English law ‘...written, stamped or typed words are prima 
facie to be given a superseding effect as against printed words....’ in documents such 
as bills of ladings. A point, which had not previously been raised during proceedings 
at fist instance, was whether the demise clause (cl. 35) and especially the words in 
parenthesis reading ‘...as may be the case notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary....’ were to be seen as a paramount clause and therefore had to be given 
priority over the contradicting signature. Elaborating on this question Rix LJ 
submitted that cl. 35 was in fact to be considered ‘...a form of paramount clause....’ 
but that the said words in parenthesis did not apply to ‘...the making of the contract, 
but to the possiblity that the vessel is not owned or demise chartered to the liner 
company which issues the bill....’.185 In other words the demise clause takes effect 
where the charterer acts as agent for the owner or demise charterer. It does not 
prevent the charterer from accepting personal liability as a carrier in the said 
context.186 According to Rix LJ, it can be concluded, that where a time charterer 
wanted to undertake a personal liablity as against the shipper the demise clause 
would not have the effect of purporting the shipowner to be carrier and the demise 
clause in this case would therefore not be considered a paramount clause. 187 Rix LJ 
furthermore submits that this conclusion was consistent with the findings in other 
cases where the demise clauses were never held to be paramount clauses.188 In 
accordance with Colman J Rix LJ therefore contends that the bills were charterers 
bills. 
 
He however raised the question of a joint liability of both the charterer and the 
shipowner as an undisclosed principal, thereby relying on Scrutton as authority189, 
and based on the argument that the bills were unauthorised due to the fact that they 
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were not signed on behalf of the master but instead for CPS as carrier. While he 
argued that there was a possibility of a joint and several liability it was not made the 
subject of this decision as it was not formally appealed.190  
It has to be noted though, that Rix LJ did not hold the demise clause as such to be 
invalid191 but that, in this context the signature on the face of the bill took precedence 
over the contradicting demise clause.  
Chadwick LJ on the other hand placed considerable weight on the fact that in 
distinction to the case of The Hector the bill in The Starsin contained both an identity 
of carrier clause as well as a demise clause. He concluded that, where both clauses 
were included in the same bill they had to be construed on the basis that each of 
them was intended to cover an own specific situation rather than being a mere 
repetition although they may well overlap.192 While he asserted that the identity of 
carrier clause only applies to cases where the bill is signed ‘for and on behalf of the 
master’ the demise clause covers cases where as here the bill is not signed ‘for and 
on behalf of the master’ but for example by port agents.193 Put in other words the 
identity of carrier clause warrants the actual or ostensible authority of the shipowner 
or demise charterer to sign on his behalf while the demise clause also covers the 
case where the charterer signs bills without the authority of the shipowner.194 As to 
the words in parenthesis Chadwick LJ submitted that their intention was to give effect 
to the demise clause in cases where at first glance it appeared that the party issuing 
the bill was the shipowner but with the relevant background knowledge, as in the 
present case, it was obvious that the issuing party was not the shipowner.195 
Chadwick LJ reached this conclusion without commenting on the issue of the 
paramount character of the demise clause or the question whether precedence be 
given to the written over the printed terms on the bill but merely by constuing the bill 
as a whole. Consequently the bills would be qualified as shipowners bills of ladings.  
Morrit V-C reached the same conclusion as Chadwick LJ. Relying on the principle 
that parties may stipulate that written provisions are not to override printed conditions 
he gave effect to the demise clause.196 Construing the bill of lading as a whole the 
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demise clause would therefore ‘...take effect notwithstanding...the contradicting 
...words....’ in the signature box.197 He further contends that when these words are 
overridden by the demise clause additionally the identity of carrier clauses takes 
effect providing for the owner of the vessel to be the carrier.  
Morrit V-C similarly reached the conclusion that the bills were in fact shipowners bills 
of ladings.  
On the question whether the bills were charterers or shipowners bills the decision of 
Colman J at first instance was reversed by majority vote.  
 
On appeal the House of Lords did not follow the decision of the Court of 
Appeal which held that the bills of ladings were shipowners bills. The Lord Judges 
unanimously held, that the bills were charterers bills. The question raised was 
whether greater weight should be given to the specially chosen words on the face of 
the bill in contrast to the standard terms printed on the reverse side of the bill.198 As a 
general rule under English Law it can be said that primacy be given to written words 
over standard terms thereby placing greater weight on the intent of the parties rather 
than standard terms which may be applicable to many voyages as opposed to 
standard terms used for a particular voyage only.199 Lord Millet also referred to § 
305b of the German Civil Code which equally spells out that ‘...specific stipulations of 
the parties override clauses contained in standard form contracts....’200  
A further point to consider in the judgement was market practice. To ascertain which 
meaning had to be given to the bill as a legal document by a reasonable person with 
the ‘...background knowledge which is available to the person or class of persons to 
whom the document is addressed....’.201 The question therefore was to whom the bill 
would usually be addressed. A bill of lading serves different purposes being a 
document of title which may be transferred to third parties or given as security for 
financial credits. These advances will usually be made by a letter of credit and the 
presentation of the bill will often be a precondition for payment by the bank. The 
reasonable reader can therefore be expected to know that bills of lading may be 
addressed to bankers. While certain details and clauses on the bill of lading will 
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warrant legal advice by a lawyer there are others which may be ascertained by the 
banker himself and without consulting a lawyer.202 As a matter of fact bankers will 
usually not resort to the back of the bill to examine the contractual terms203 This has 
been reinforced by art. 23 of the ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (UCP 500). Art. 23 states that banks will not examine the contents on the 
back of the bill of lading.204 It is suggested that this view conforms with the need for 
prompt decisions in international trade.205 As far as the charterers contends that art. 
23 of the UCP was irrelevant with regard to the interpretation of the bill by the parties 
in the present case it was held that anyone versed in the shipping trade would have 
the knowledge that bills of ladings are potentially addressed to banks and that a 
reasonable reader would not expect that a different meaning be given to the bill 
either by banks or parties to the contract of carriage.206 To ascertain who the carrier 
for this purpose is only the front of the document containing details concerning the 
goods, vessel and voyage will be relevant.207 Where as in the present case therefore 
it is plain from the face of the bill who the carrier is a reasonable reader would not 
construe the bill as whole but would rely on the facts stated on the face of the bill. 
Where however the front of the bill appears to be obscure it can be expected that 
legal advice be sought by the addressee in order to construe the bill as whole 
including the demise and identity of carrier clause.208  
The term carrier as used in the present case is therefore understood to be a technical 
term with the legal meaning attached to it and not as in The Flecha loosely used to 
describe the charterer.209 
The possibility of a joint liability between owners and charterers was raised but the 
Lords unanimously held that from the wording in the signature box in the present 
case the ‘...bill of lading contemplated a single carrier....’210. Commenting on this 
point Lord Bingham further stated that the fact that this suggestion was raised by a 
member of the Court of Appeal made this contention less credible.211  
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While the Judgement in The Starsin clearly changed the way in which bills of 
ladings are to be construed thereby reducing the relevance of demise and identity of 
carrier clauses in cases where from the face of the bill it appears plain who the 
carrier is, it has to be noted that the validity and effect of the demise clause as such 
was not questioned by the House of Lords. Lord Hobhouse held the demise clause to 
be a standard clause and found that ‘...one would have been surprised not to find it in 
these bills of lading....’212  
 
The defendant shipowners alleged that there was an inconsistency between the role 
assigned to CPS as carrier and the descriptions elsewhere in the text of the bill and 
that‘...preponderant importance....’ was to be given to the terms written into the 
contract by the parties over standard printed terms thereby relying on the judgement 
of the House of Lords in Universal Steam Navigation Ltd. v. James McKelvie and 
Co.213 
 
Lord Bingham suggested that a business sense be given to business documents, 
which would usually be a straightforward sense.214 The fact that the suggestion of a 
joint liability by the shipowners was only submitted during the appeal made it a less 
credible option. 
 
Great weight was furthermore placed on the fact that the bill was obviously not 
signed by the master but by the agents for CPS as carrier. The term carrier was 
understood to have an ‘...old and familiar meaning....’ in maritime trade.215  
It was held that a shipper could not be expected to resort to the conditions on the 
reverse of the bill containing inter alia a demise and an identity of carrier clause 
where the face of the bill clearly and unambiguously indicated who the carrier was. 
He found this view fortified by art. 23 of the ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits providing guidance for banks when dealing with credits covered 
by a bill of lading. Under art. 23 (v) it is made clear that banks will generally not resort 
to the terms and conditions on the back of the bill. In the present case CPS could be 
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unambiguously identified from the face of the bill and therefore was held to be the 
carrier.216 
 
1.2.4 Comments on the Starsin 
The ruling of the House of Lords in The Starsin has come under criticism from 
authorities such as Prof. Tetley. He submits that in cases such as the present the 
question of who is liable as a carrier under bills of ladings should not be exclusively 
decided as between the shipowner and the charterer but both the shipowner and the 
charterer should be held responsible jointly.217  
He asserts that Art. 3(8) of the Hague/Visby Rules which reads: 
 
‘...Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving 
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection 
with, goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and 
obligations provided in this article or lessening such liability otherwise than 
as provided in these Rules, shall be null and void and of no effect....’ 
 
is a provision is of ‘...a public policy/order nature....’ and therefore cannot be 
contracted out.218 As set out above the problem surfaces especially in cases of time 
charters where the ships management is divided between the shipowner and the 
charterer219 and both share responsibilities as provided for in articles 2, 3, and 4 of 
the Hague/Visby Rules which cannot be contracted out under article 3 (8) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules.220 Demise and identity of carrier clauses purport to deny any 
responsibility on the part of (usually) the charterer and according to Tetley are 
‘...effectively non-responsibility clauses....’ contravening the mandatory application of 
the Hague/Visby Rules and should consequently be invalid by virtue of article 3 
(8).221  
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It is furthermore submitted that demise and identity of carrier clauses not only 
contravene the mandatory provision of article 3 (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules but also 
should be invalid as against third parties who would have to bear the burden of 
ascertaining the relationships between the shipowner and the charterers.222  
 
Prof. Tetley asserts that the House of Lords did not raise cases of foreign courts 
especially those which held the demise clause to be violating art. 3 (8) of the 
Hague/Visby Rules.223 It has to be noted however, that Lord Millet224 referred to the 
German BGH in the above mentioned decision of the MS Planet I where the court in 
applying § 305b BGB held that the identity of carrier clause was overridden by the 
charterers name printed on the face of the bill of lading and the signature of the 
charterers agent.225 While the issue of a joint liability according to Schmidt was raised 
the court held, that in the present case the bill of lading was issued by the time 
charterer and there was no indication that the charterers agent also signed as agent 
for the shipowners.226 Thus the bills were charterers bills of ladings. A decision which 
therefore appears to be in line with the judgement of the House of Lords in The 
Starsin. 
 
The decisions of other nations arguably were not given much weight in the decision 
of The Starsin. It has to be noted though that judgements of other nations appear to 
be conflicting as will be shown with respect to the situation in Japan where in a 
recent decision a demise clause was deemed to identify the carrier and did not 
contravene Art. 15.1 of the Japanese COGSA (Art. 3 (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules). 
While the Hague/Visby Rules are an international convention it cannot be 
convincingly stated that there is an ‘...internationally accepted meaning of the 
rules....’227 which may enable a court to construe the rules accordingly. 
The ruling of the House of Lords does therefore not contravene the Vienna 
Convention which stipulates in art. 31 (1) that a treaty ‘...A treaty shall be interpreted 
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in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose....’228 
 
It is furthermore asserts that identity of carrier and demise clauses are technically 
inconsistent with the UCP 500 which provides that the carrier be named on the face 
of the bill of lading.229  
In the present case, the bills prima facie appear to meet the requirements of the UCP 
500. The bills however, only mentioned the charterer as carrier and did not mention 
the shipowner. According to Prof. Tetley, the bills did not reflect the identity of the 
carrier and were therefore inconsistent with art. 23 (a) (i), UCP 500230.  
It firstly has to be noted though, that the UCP 500 are neither an international 
convention nor do they have the force of law in England.231 While it may be 
inconsistent with certain clauses in bills of ladings this merely represents a factual 
argument as against the effect of demise or identity of carrier clauses which will 
probably change the design and the way bills of ladings will be regarded after the 
decision of the House of Lords in The Starsin.  
Secondly, to assume that the signature mentioning only the charterer as carrier was 
inconsistent with the provisions of art. 23 (a) (i) of the UCP 500 requires, as a 
precondition, that one shares the view of Prof. Tetley which is that, by virtue of art. 3 
(8) of the Hague/Visby Rules both, the shipowner and the charterer are jointly liable 
as carriers as they share obligations under the contract of carriage.  
It cannot be submitted that this raises a further argument against the validity of 
demise clauses as it already presupposes that both shipowner and charterer are 
jointly liable as carriers for the above-mentioned reason. Claiming that art. 23 of the 
UCP 500 ‘...raises another argument for the invalidity of demise and identity of carrier 
clauses....’232 is, may I respectfully suggest, a circular argument and does not support 
Prof. Tetley’s conclusion.  
Furthermore, the wording of art. 23 (a) (i) of the UCP 500, contrary to the 
submissions of Prof. Tetley, seems to take into consideration that there might be 
contradictions if the whole of the bill was to be construed. The provision thus aims to 
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simplify the situation by merely demanding the bank to examine the face of the bill in 
order to verify the identity of the carrier.  
 
Arguably, demise clauses are incompatible with the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, 1994. It is argued that demise clauses are 
contrary to the stipulations in art. 1.7 (1) which provides that contracting parties  
 
‘...act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international 
trade....’233 The reasons for this assumption are the above mentioned.  
 
One may argue that, under certain jurisdictions such as the Canadian, the demise 
and identity of carrier clauses may violate art. 3 (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules. The 
other arguments in the author’s humble opinion do not seem to be imperative. 
 
Conclusion 
As shown above a number of courts have held demise and identity of carrier clauses 
to be valid as merely identifying the carrier. The main argument for this conclusion 
being that where the shipper submits a bill of lading containing said clauses for 
signature thereby agrees to be bound by it.234 Where however, the bill of lading 
follows an agreement, courts have held, that these may override standard clauses in 
bills of ladings.235. 
 
1.3 Canada 
1.3.1 Applicable Law  
As in the other jurisdictions discussed, Canadian legislation has adopted the 
Hague/Visby Rules by virtue of Schedule I to the Carriage of Goods by Water Act, 
SC 1993 and the Hamburg Rules.236 The later were not put into force.237  
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1.3.2 Canadian cases 
The subject of the validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses is not treated in a 
uniform manner by Canadian courts.  
While earlier rulings held these clauses to be invalid or at least ineffective as against 
the carrier238 two recent decisions have seemingly rehabilitated them.239 
Early Canadian decisions held demise and identity of carrier clauses to be valid.240 
However, they mostly relied on the decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Paterson Steamships v. Aluminium Co. of Canada241 and Aris Steamship v. 
Associated Metals & Minerals242 although both cases did not involve demise clauses. 
Furthermore they invoked the obiter dictum of Brandon J in The Berkshire. In The 
Berkshire as well as in Paterson the charterer was not defendant to the action.243 
 
In Canadian Klockner v. D/S A/S Flint (The Mica) however, the Federal Court of 
Canada held the identity of carrier clause invalid as violating the mandatory provision 
of art. 3 (8) of the Hague Rules thereby allowing suit against the charterer.244 
 
In Canficorp v. Cormorant Bulk-Carriers245 the Federal Court of Appeal held the 
charterer to be carrier. The facts of this case were unusual however, as the shipper 
was sued by the time charterer and it was the shipper who tried to invoke the identity 
of carrier clause in order to establish that the charterer was not party to the contract 
of carriage.246  
The identity of carrier clause was however not determinative as to the identification of 
the carrier but rather the fact that the charterer performed carriers duties.  
 
‘...Of some significance is the fact that the respondent loaded and 
discharged the goods....’247 
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In Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. C.N. Marine248 the decision of the Trial Court was 
affirmed by the Federal Court of Canada which held inter alia that the demise clause 
violated art. 3 (8) of the Hague/Visby Rules. 
 
In Canastrand Industries Ltd. v. Lara S (The) (T.D.)249 Judge Reed J referred to 
Prof. Tetley in holding that: 
 
‘...Usually, suit is valid against both the owner and the charterer...Carriage 
of goods is effectively a joint venture owners and charterers (except in the 
case of a bareboat charter) and, consequently, they should be held jointly 
and severally responsible as carriers. 
 
The logic of holding both the shipowner and the charterer liable as carrier 
seems entirely reasonable under a charter such as exists in this case. The 
master will have knowledge of the vessel and any peculiarities which must 
be taken into account when stowing goods thereon. He supervises that 
stowage. He has responsibility for the conduct of the voyage and 
presumably also has knowledge of the type of weather conditions it would 
be usual to encounter. In such a case it seems entirely appropriate to find 
the master and therefore, his employer, the shipowner jointly [and 
severally]250 liable with the charterer for damage arising out of inadequate 
stowage....’ 
 
It thus can be said that Canadian decisions prior to 1997 generally held demise and 
identity clauses to either be invalid or at least ineffective as against the shipper or as 
in the case of Canficorp v. Cormorant Bulk Carriers against the charterer. 
 
In Methanex New Zealand Ltd. v. Kinugawa (The) (T.D.)251 the effect of a jurisdiction 
clause in the bill of lading and the question whether litigation was to take place in 
Japan or in Canada was at issue. The judge summed up the arguments of counsel 
                                                          
248 Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. C.N. Marine [1990] 1 F.C. 483.  
249 Website of the Office of the Commisioner for Federal Judicial Affairs of Canada: http: 
//receuil.cmf.gc.ca/fc/1993/pub/v2/1993fca0386.html; Reference [1993] 2 F.C. 553 
250 It seems as if an error was committed in omitting the words ‘and severally’, as Reed J refers 
directly to Tetley Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed. 1988 at p. 242.  
251 Methanex New Zealand Ltd v. Kinugawa (The) (T.D.) Website of the Office of the Commissioner for 
Federal Judicial Affairs http://reports.fja.gc.ca/fc/src/shtml/1998/pub/v2/1998fc1932.shtml  
Identifying the carrier  Jens Weinmann 
 38
for the plaintiffs which referred to Carling O’Keefe Breweries Company Ltd. v. C.N 
Marine Inc. where the demise clause was held to be invalid under art. 3 (8) of the 
Hague Rules.  
Counsel for the plaintiffs however, did not argue that this is the general view under 
Canadian law, but that the question of who the carrier is, is a question of fact. 
According to this submission the carrier may either be the charterer, the shipowner or 
both. The court did not decide whether or not the demise clause is valid but reached 
the result that 
 
‘...reference to the Court in Japan would be a lessening of liability to 
the ship owner and thus become a distinct advantage to the 
defendant....’ 
 
as under Japanese Law only the shipowner is carrier. 252 
 
This view has changed considerably with findings of Canadian Courts in the most 
recent decisions of Union Carbide253 and Jian Sheng254 both of which rehabilitated 
demise and identity of carrier clauses under Canadian law. 
In Union Carbide the time charterer, Fednav Ltd., was sued by the plaintiff shipper for 
damage sustained to a cargo of synthetic resin shipped from Montreal to the far east 
under bills of lading. The time charterer invoked an identity of carrier clause in 
defence. The court held that: 
 
‘...unless there is a clear undertaking by the time charterer, that he will 
carry the shipper’s goods, the shipowner is the carrier....’255 
 
According to the court there was no such undertaking on the part of the time 
charterer. Thus the identity of carrier clause would not be invalidated by the court and 
therefore be binding on the shipowner as the bills of lading were owners bills.  
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Nadon J furthermore denied the notion that art. 1 (a) of the Hague Visby Rules as 
implemented by the Canadian COGSA confirms Prof. Teteley’s theory of a joint 
venture, and thus joint and severall liability, which he held to be unsound: 
 
‘...there cannot be a joint venture between owners and charterers unless 
there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties to the joint 
venture....’ 256 
 
Consequently, according to Nadon J, the general rule under art. 1 (a) of the Hague 
Visby Rules would be that shipowner and charterer are not jointly and severally 
liable.  
The action against the defendant time charterer would therefore be dismissed.  
 
In Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A.257 the notify party of a consignment of lumber 
shipped under a standard liner bill of lading from British Columbia to Taiwan, sued 
the shipowner, the charterer and others interested in the Ship Trans Aspiration. The 
bill of lading contained an identity of carrier clause stipulating that the contract of 
carriage was between the Merchant and the vessel owner. It also contained a 
jurisdiction clause providing that  
 
‘...any disputes arising under the bill of lading would be decided in 
the country where the carrier has its principal place of business....’258 
 
The question in this case was whether the jurisdiction clause was void for 
uncertainty.  
At first instance Hargrave J held that both shipowner and charterer were jointly and 
severally liable ‘...not withstanding any identity or demise clauses....’ and that the 
jurisdiction clause was void for uncertainty. 259 
 
The Federal Court, Trial Division, reversed the pronothary’s denial of stay of 
proceedings thereby giving effect to the identity of carrier clause. The judge followed 
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the decision of Union Carbide where the notion of a joint and several liability was 
rejected.260 
Consequently the jurisdiction clause was not void for uncertainty, as only the 
shipowner Great Tempo S.A. and not the time charterer could be considered carrier . 
 
The case subsequently referred to the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal. ‘...The 
issue was whether the jurisdiction clause was void for uncertainty as a matter of 
principle or in the circumstances....’261 
In order to so however, the court implicitly had to determine the identity of the carrier 
and thereby the validity of the identity of carrier clause.  
The judge held, that  
 
‘...This type of jurisdiction clause should not be declared invalid for 
uncertainty as a matter of principle....[as]...there was no ambiguity in this 
case...[and]....it meant exactly what it said....’262  
 
He further submitted that standard clauses such as jurisdiction and identity of carrier 
clauses have been applied in the industry and the courts for ages and that it is to late 
to alter there usage.263 He furthermore denied the approach which, according to the 
plaintiffs counsel, would be more in conformity with international consensus on this 
issue and which is set out in art. 21 of the Hamburg Rules. He asserted however that 
this convention has not been signed by maritime powers such as France, Germany 
or the U.S. and that it cannot be stated that a consensus on this issue exists. He 
consequently found that the jurisdiction was not invalid in principle.264 
 
On the question of voidness for uncertainty in the circumstances he held that: 
 
‘...in shipowners bills of lading, there is a presumption that the shipowner 
is the carrier. In charterers bills of lading, on the other hand, the 
presumption is that the demise charterer is the carrier. Any other can be 
                                                          
260 Tetley, supra, fn 239, at p. 834.  
261 Jiang Sheng Co. Ltd. v. Great Tempo S.A. and Others Website of the Office of the Commisioner for 




Identifying the carrier  Jens Weinmann 
 41
the carrier only where the above presumptions have been rebutted, and 
such rebuttal occurs only where there is evidence that such other has 
actually assumed the role of carrier under the contract of carriage with the 
shipper....’265 
 
He furthermore held that the concept of joint and several liability as promoted by Prof. 
Tetley was an “American influenced principle” and ‘...incompatible with the gist of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in Paterson SS and in Aris Steamship....’. He agreed 
with the findings of Nadon J in Union Carbide who held that the said concept was 
“unsound”.  
The jurisdiction clause was upheld. The court did not definitely rule on the validity of 
the identity of carrier clause.  
 
1.3.3 Comments on the Jiang Sheng and the Union Carbide  
The decision of the Jiang Sheng and the Union Carbide have come under 
criticism from Canadian authorities. Besides the arguments generally raised 
against the validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses there are also 
specific arguments brought forward against the two said decisions. 
Prof Tetley remarks that neither of the two decisions mentioned art. 3 (8) of the 
Hague Rules.266 He furthermore assets that in the decision of the Jian Sheng 
the validity of the clause was not considered in principle.267 
Considering the decision of Union Carbide Marler D takes the same position. 
He submits that the signature on the bill of lading “for and on behalf of the 
master” does not exclusively limit liability to the shipowner but rather extend it to 
the shipowner in addition to the charterer who agreed to carry the cargo. 
According to Marler the Masters signature merely evidences ‘...the quantity and 
condition of the cargo loaded....’.268 The judge therefore erred in relying on 
Paterson and Aris.269 
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Conclusion 
It can be said that the situation regarding this issue is uncertain under Canadian 
law as judgements are conflicting. It seems though that demise and identity of 
carrier clauses are being reinstated. 
 
2. Civil Law Countries 
2.1 Germany 
2.1.1 Applicable law 
The German law applicable to claims under bills of lading disputes is the German 
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch).270 Under German law there is no definition 
of the term carrier (Verfrachter).271 Carrier is the party having concluded the contract 
of carriage with the shipper in his own name.272 
 
2.1.2 General position 
The carrier under German law is obliged to issue a bill of lading under § 642 (I) HGB. 
He then is liable under the bill of lading. According to § 642 (IV) HGB the master of 
the vessel or any other person authorised by the owner may sign bills of ladings with 
effect for the contractual carrier.273 The masters signature will therefore bind the 
contractual carrier whether or not he is identical with the owner of the vessel. Only in 
cases where the name of the owner is explicitly mentioned as such and therefore 
indicates that owner and carrier are not identical will the the masters signature bind 
the owner of the vessel.274 Usually the charterer will be bound as carrier.275 
Appendices to the signature such as “for and on behalf of the owner” do not have an 
impact on the question of the identity of the carrier.276  
 
2.1.3 The German position in respect of Demise or Identity of Carrier clauses 
Purpose of the IOC clause 
The original purpose of the identity of carrier clause was to enable the charterer as 
contractual carrier the benefit of limiting his liability which prior to the first HGB 
                                                          
270 German Commercial Code 1897 (RGBl. 219) hereinafter referred to/cited as HGB. 
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amending act of 1972 was only available to the owner. Consequently earlier 
judgements would acknowledge the possible validity of identity of carrier clauses.277 
As the charterer could henceforth rely on the limitation of the Hague Rules the 
original justification for the existence of the identity of carrier clause had vanished. It 
was suggested then, that the identity of carrier clauses would gradually loose 
significance.278 This assumption however, proved to be wrong.  
 
2.1.3.1 Validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses 
Originally, the validity of identity of carrier clauses under German law was merely a 
question of authority. Nowadays the problem lies in the compatibility with the 
Standard Contracts Act 1976 (AGBG), now implemented into the German Civil Code 
(Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, 1896)279 
 
2.1.3.1.1 Agency Law 
The question would be whether the charterer acted as representative for the 
owner. As a necessary precondition under German agency law the charterer would 
have to sign bills of ladings in the name of the owner and with authority or approval, § 
164 BGB. This was disputed as the charterer usually issues own bills of ladings 
under his name. It would therefore appear from the face of the bill of lading that the 
person signing would sign for the charterer rather than the owner.280 This was 
perceived/understood to be as (a) problem of obviousness with regard to § 164 I S. 2 
BGB. A further problem was seen in the authority of the charterer to bind the 
owner.281 Originally the tendency among German courts was mostly to deny the 
validity of identity of carrier clauses. While the possibility of representation was 
generally acknowledged the courts mostly held, that the charterer was not authorised 
by the owner282 or lacked obviousness.283 Courts nowadays hold, that the owner of 
the vessel is easily discernible through Lloyd’s Register which in turn means that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
276 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44 at p.33.  
277 Hanseatisches OLG Hamburg, Judgement delivered on 15.2.1966 – 6 U 174/65 cited in MDR 20 
(1966) 680. 
278 Poetschke, supra, fn 44, at p.43. 
279 Hereinafter refered to as BGB. 
280 Poetschke, supra, fn. 44, at p 44. 
281 Ibid 
282 The court did not comment on the validity of the identity of carrier clause OLG Hamburg Judgement 
delivered on 22.5.1969 cited in Versicherungsrecht 21 (1970) 79. 
283 OLG Hamburg judgement delivered on 9.1.1975 cited in Versicherungsrecht 26 (1975) 826.  
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obviousness is no longer regarded as a problem in this context.284 Furthermore the 
charterer will regularly be authorised to sign bills of ladings with binding effect for the 
owner through clauses in the charter party.  
 
2.1.3.1.2 Identity of carrier clauses and the German Standard Terms Act 
(German Civil Code) 
As mentioned above the problem at present lies with the question whether 
identity of carrier and demise clauses contravene the standard terms act. German 
courts had the opportunity to rule on this issue. It was concluded that the German 
Standard Terms Act was applicable with regard to bills of lading.285 
In the more recent decision of the MS Planet I the Regional Appeal Court of 
Hamburg286 had to deal with the validity of identity of carrier clauses.287. The vessel 
was at all material times on time charter and bills of lading for the containers loaded 
were duly issued to the shippers. The bills of lading were issued under the name of 
the charterer and signed by its agent as agent for the charterer288. The shippers sued 
the owner. The court had to answer the question whether the owner of the vessel 
was liable as carrier under the contract of carriage as evidenced by the bills of 
lading.289 It is generally accepted under German law that clauses under bills of 
ladings are subject to the Standard Contracts Act290 As a necessary precondition 
under German law the owner would have had to impose the conditions of the 
standard contract on the shipper291 The court held that the owner imposed the 
standard-contract terms by authorising the charterer to issue bills of ladings including 
the identity of carrier clause. Under the rule concerning uncertainty the respective 
term within the bill of lading as a standard contract has to be construed on imposers 
account292. The reason being that the wording on the face of the bill of lading 
identified the charterer as carrier and thus contradicted clause 21 on the back of the 
said bill of lading, which purported the owner to be the carrier with regard to the 
                                                          
284 HOLG Hamburg MDR 1967, 499, see also Rabe p. 81, 85. 
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contract evidenced by the bill of lading293. The effect being that the beneficial 
construction as against the recipient would prevail294.  
The claimant therefore had title to sue the owner as carrier295.The court held that, the 
claim against the owner was justified on the grounds that the identity of carrier clause 
in the bill of lading contravened § 5 of the Standard Contracts Act 1976. 296.as the 
there was uncertainty on whether the charterer or the owner were obliged to deliver 
the goods.297 The appeal court did not question the validity of clause 21 under 
German law298. The competent court held that, unlike the House of Lords finding in 
the Starsin, it made no difference that the clause was printed on the back page of the 
bill of lading and consequently had to be construed as a whole299. The charterer 
through its agents had the necessary authority to bind the owner according to § 164 
(I) BGB as he was disclosed by clause 21300. Although the owners name was not 
contained in the bill of lading explicitly, the court held that through the vessels name 
mentioned in the bill of lading the owner could have been clearly identified through 
the Lloyd’s Register in London301. 
The judgement was reversed by the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof)302 The court held that § 5 AGBG was not applicable as there 
was no ambiguity within the bill of lading as evidence of the standard contract303. 
Clause 21 made it clear that the contract was between the shipper and the owner304. 
The ambiguity between the facts gathered from the face of the bill of lading and the 
clause on the back page did however not constitute an ambiguity necessary for the 
application of § 5 AGBG305. The Court gave effect to § 4 AGBG which states that 
non-standard agreements shall prevail over the standard agreements306. In this case 
it could be gathered from the face of the bill of lading that the charterer assumed the 
role of the carrier as he was to ship the said goods307. The court held that this was a 
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non-standard term which prevailed over the clause 21 being a standard term308. The 
clause on the back of the bill of lading was therefore invalid under § 4 AGBG as it 
contravened the non-standard agreement evidenced by the face of the bill of lading. 
The court did not however comment on the validity of identity of carrier clauses in 
general but made it clear that with regard to this case, clause 21 would not be 
applicable with regarded to the identification of the carrier as it clearly contravened 
what the court found to be a non-standard agreement due to its specific character. 
The court therefore held that, the claim as against the owner was unfounded. The 




These latest judgements of the OLG and the BGH have received a mixed 
reception among German authorities.  
Herber submits that there was no ambiguity within the bill of lading itself.310 He states 
that from the statement of the facts of the OLG decision it appeared that there was 
no indication that the charterer merely wanted to represent the owner as carrier 
which in turn meant that there was no explicit ambiguity derived from the terms of the 
bill of lading itself but rather from the construction of the bill of lading in this specific 
case.311 Only an explicit ambiguity between the mentioning of the non-standard term 
on the face of the bill of lading and the demise clause he asserts, could lead to an 
application of § 4 AGBG.312 He accords with the findings of the OLG that, as a 
general rule under German law the owner is represented by the charterer as his 
identity can be ascertained through Lloyds Register in London.313 Even if the 
charterer lacks explicit authority to bind the owner he has the power of representation 
by acquiescence.314 Herber draws a distinction between the liability of the vessels 
owner under the bill of lading and the contract of carriage concluded with the 
charterer.315 He therefore does not rule out the possibility that the cargo owners may 
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sue the charterer under the contract of carriage.316 His conclusion in the case of the 
MS Planet I is that the cargo owners have title to sue the shipowners as carriers 
under the bill of lading.  
 
With regard to the judgement of the OLG Hamburg stated above Schmidt 
submits that the charterer has to be held as the imposer of the standard terms 
contract.317 The question under German law would therefore be whether the 
shipowner can at least be jointly held as the imposer of the standard contract 
alongside the charterer.318 Schmidt accords with the findings of the OLG, which held 
that this was the case. He however disagrees with the OLG’s application of § 5 
AGBG319 Firstly, clause 21 itself is not ambiguous as the owner is named as carrier 
under the bill of lading and his identity may be ascertained easily320 giving effect to 
the demands of § 164 (I) BGB.321 Secondly, there is no contradiction/ambiguity 
between clauses but merely an ambiguity between the identity clause and the 
construction of the bill of lading as a whole.322 Schmidt however asserts that the 
situation would be if the charterer was to be sued under the bill of lading and was to 
rely on the identity of carrier clause to avoid liability as the identity of carrier clause 
may then be classified as a hidden clause, which is forbidden under the AGBG.323 In 
the case of the MS Planet I however, Schmidt does not accord with the OLG’s 
application of § 5 AGBG. For Schmidt the problem lies with the question who is 
entitled and bound by the issuing of the bill of lading.324 Is it the shipowner, the 
charterer or both? He asserts that the bill of lading signed by the charterers agent is 
unclear as it cannot be determined who the carrier is. As shown above the problem 
under German law is a problem of authority. The agent firstly signs for the charterer 
whom he is authorised to represent.325 The bill of lading however, also encompasses 
the identity of carrier clause. The question is whether this entitles the charterers 
agent to bind the owner as well. The risk of suing the wrong party being on the 
shippers as claimants. Schmidt believes that this case calls for an additional 
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safeguard to ensure that both, the charterer and the owner are bound.326 Schmidt 
tries to solve the problem by giving effect to § 644 HGB.327 It is however debatable 
whether this provision is meant to solve the abovementioned problem as the problem 
is not that no carrier is named in the bill of lading.328 According to Schmidt the 
purpose of § 644 HGB is to force the shipowner to comply with the identity of carrier 
clause.329 The Shipowner can therefore not claim that he was not represented by the 
charterer due to a lack of obviousness, § 164 (II) BGB. Even if, as in the case of the 
MS Planet I there is an identity of carrier clause there is a lack of obviousness which 
shall be prevented by the provision of § 644 HGB. This is gathered from a liberal 
interpretation of the said provision.330 According to Schmidt the shipowner would 
therefore be liable under § 644 HGB. § 644 HGB protects the interests of the cargo 
owner and does not prevent him from suing the charterer under the contract of 
carriage.331 In this case the cargo owner can however only sue the shipowner as 
carrier under the bill of lading. Notwithstanding the general rule of § 644 HGB the 
charterer may be sued as carrier under a bill of lading if he assumes the role of a 
carrier which may often be the case under time charters. Schmidt characterizes the 
function of § 644 HGB as protecting the cargo owner by holding that the shipowner is 
liable as a carrier under a bill of lading.  
 
Accordingly two possibilities may be distinguished. 
Firstly, as far as no contractual carrier can be identified § 644 HGB provides that the 
shipowner is to be deemed carrier.  
Secondly, if a contractual carrier other than the shipowner can be identified as carrier 
under a bill of lading § 644 HGB does not have the power to change the identity of 
the so found carrier. In this case the charterer as contractual carrier cannot rely on 
the identity of carrier clause to avoid liability.332 The cargo owner can however, sue 
the shipowner under § 644 HGB.333  
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While the shipowner can always be held liable under § 644 HGB the charterer may 
be held liable under the bill of lading if he is to be identified as carrier. Although the 
term ‘carrier’ is generally avoided there is a difference. Technically, § 644 HGB 
establishes a legal fiction in favour of the shipper which does not make the shipowner 
a carrier under a bill of lading governed by the Hague Rules or a valid identity of 
carrier clause as Schmidt334 puts it. He therefore promotes a joint and several liability 
of the shipowner and the charterer similar to Tetley.335 Although strictly speaking the 
owner does not assume the role of a carrier under the bill of lading where § 644 HGB 
is liberally applied it further has to be construed that, as according to § 644 HGB the ‘ 
owner is deemed to be carrier’ he may rely on the package limitations of the Hague 
Rules. Schmidt faces significant criticism among German authorities. Even Schmidt 
admits that his extensive interpretation of the provision does not conform with the will 
of the historic legislator.336 In general § 644 HGB is not as extensively interpreted 
and shall therefore only apply in the abovementioned case where the name of the 
carrier is not indicated on the bill of lading.337 Although it is claimed that this causes 
inequities.338 Historically cargo owners could additionally sue the shipowner in rem, § 
754 Nr. 7 HGB. The provision however, was cancelled in 1972. It seems to be widely 
accepted that even if the provision applies the charterer as contractual carrier cannot 
be held liable under a bill of lading.339  
Only according to Schmidt can there be a joint liability under the Hague Rules as 
shown above. Schmidt tries to establish this rule by taking recourse to cases where 
managers represented closely associated businesses without properly disclosing the 
principals identity.340 Rabe states that the cases under German law stated by 
Schmidt are significantly different from this case.341 He argues that the responsibility 
of the agent is to procure shipments and sign carriage contracts and bills of 
ladings.342 Without knowledge of the details of the charterparty the agent will 
generally be ignorant of the fact whose vessel is being loaded even if the charterer 
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was authorised to represent the owner.343 He only has a contractual relationship with 
the charterer. 344 Only the charterer can therefore be bound by his agents signature. 
Others assert that a joint and several liability of both, charterer and owner fails on 
different grounds. Firstly, the ruling of the BGH in the said decision cannot be 
considered to justify a joint and several liability as the court merely held, that the 
charterer is liable under the contract of carriage although the owner is liable under § 
644 HGB. The court however, did not rule that the charterer also remains liable under 
the bill of lading.345 As mentioned above there is a strict distinction between the 
contract of carriage and obligations arising out of the bill of lading.  
Secondly, the grammatical interpretation of the said provision does not allow for a 
joint liability as only the owner is deemed to be the carrier.346 The purpose of § 644 
HGB is only to guarantee the negotiability of the bill of lading.347 Thirdly, a joint 
liability approach is not supported by a contextual interpretation of the provision as 
the master lacks authority to bind both the owner348 Fourthly, the equitable 
construction of § 644 S. 1 HGB does not warrant the notion of joint and several 
liability. The purpose of § 644 HGB to protect the bill of lading holder is already 
achieved by deeming the owner to be carrier.349  
Under current German law the judgement of the BGH in the Planet I would appear to 
be right. From the face of the bill of lading the bill of lading holder will have the 
impression of the charterer being the (contractual) carrier. This however clearly 
contravenes the identity of carrier clause on the back of the bill of lading within the 
meaning of § 4 AGBG. The details on the face of the bill of lading have to be qualified 
as non-standard agreements which will be given precedence over standard 
agreements such as the identity of carrier clause. 
 
2.1.4 The identity of carrier clause in blank bills of ladings 
If carrier is apparent from the face of the bill of lading there can be no 
contradiction to the identity of carrier clause as provided for in § 4 AGBG. Bills of 
ladings require written form, § 126 BGB. The bill of lading holder has to rely on the 
facts laid down in the bill of lading, § 656 HGB. Facts not apparent from the bill of 
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lading such as non-standard oral agreements cannot be considered. Consequently § 
4 AGBG will not apply and it appears that the identity of carrier clause in the case of 
a blank bill of lading would be valid under German law. 350 
The identity of carrier clause will only bear relevance where the legal fiction of § 644 
HGB does not apply. Where the master or another authorised agent of the owner 
signs the bill of lading the owner will be deemed carrier and held liable under § 644 
HGB without taking recourse to the identity of carrier clause.351  
§ 644 HGB will however not apply where the charterer or his agents sign blank bills 
of ladings unless they act with the authorisation of the owner.352 Otherwise the 
identity of carrier clause remains relevant.353  
 
Conclusion 
Where the owner is liable under an identity of carrier clause the consequence is 
comparable to the case of § 644 HGB.354 The owners liability only extends to rights 
and obligations under the bill of lading not however as party to the contract of 
carriage which under German law has to be distinguished from the contract of 
affreightment. Neither the terms of the contract nor the person of the carrier can be 
replaced or changed through the bill of lading. Although most German authorities 
agree that a joint liability may be desirable355 the majority opinion is, that this goal 
can only be achieved by the ratification and transfer of the Hamburg Rules into 
German law. 356 
 
2.2 Japan  
2.2.1 Applicable law 
Under Japanese Law, the carriage of goods by sea is regulated by the Commercial 
Code, 1897357 applying merely to inland navigation and the Carriage of goods by sea 
act, 1992 which is based on the Hague-Visby Rules, and applies to‘...international 
movements....’.358  
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2.2.2 General rule under Japanese Law 
The view on the effect and validity of demise and identity of carrier clauses under 
Japanese law has changed in recent decisions 
 
2.2.3 Japanese Cases 
• The Jasmin 
Under the Japanese Law of carriage it was traditionally conceived that ‘...there could 
only be one carrier....’359 Under Art. 2 (2) the carrier may be the shipowner, lessee, or 
the charterer360 ‘...In the case of a time charter party...however..., the carrier was the 
time charterer....’361 It thus came as a surprise when the Tokyo District Court in the 
1991 decision of the Jasmin362 recognized the validity of a demise clause under 
Japanese law.363 In this case the shipowner was sued by the voyage charterers 
letting the vessel from the time charterers. The rule established prior to this case in 
the case of the R.D. Tata necessarily implied that demise clauses were invalid under 
Japanese law.364 Although the view that there could only be one carrier under 
Japanese law was upheld, the competent court found that the parties could agree on 
the identity of the carrier.365 Both, the Tokyo High Court366 and the Supreme Court367 
later affirmed the judgement. In this case the plaintiffs sued the shipowner and the 
time charterer in respect of damage to the cargo. The contract of carriage evidenced 
by bills of lading was governed by Japanese law and contained a demise clause on 
the reverse of the bill of lading. The bill of lading was signed with the expression ‘For 
the Master’ which according to the competent court generally indicates that the 
shipowner is party to the contract of carriage and therfore carrier.368 The Chief 
Justice firstly held that the fact that the charterers name was printed in block letter at 
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the head of the bill of lading was in itself not sufficient to make him the carrier as ‘...it 
is common in the shipping industry for bills of ladings which are not charterer’s bills to 
contain the name of the charterer at the top....’369 Secondly it was held that the 
‘...shipowner retains a residual responsibility in respect of the specialised and 
technical aspects such as loading, stowing and safe-keeping and discharge of the 
cargo....’370. It thus cannot be said that under Art. 3.1. of the Japanese COGSA the 
charterer would necessarily have to be the carrier.371 Thirdly the court was of the 
opinion that the demise clause did not have the effect of reducing the liability of the 
carrier but ‘...merely specified his identity....’372 The demise clause thus cannot be 
construed as contravening Art. 15.1 Japanese COGSA which gives effect to Art. III 
(8) of the Hague Rules as enacted into Japanese law.373 The Chief Justice 
furthermore found that, in case of a claim the maritime property of the shipowner 
would constitute the best security and thus best protect the interests of the 
claimants.374 It is asserted however, that before the said decision the plaintiffs could 
claim against the charterer, usually being a reputable company without having to 
arrest the carrying vessel in Japan which may prove difficult.375 The reception among 
Japanese authorities in respect of this judgement has therefore not been an overall 
positive one. It can be said however, that the decision of the Jasmin put Japanese 
law ‘...in line with the Judgements in the leading English cases....’.376  
 
• The Camfair 
In the more recent judgement of the Camfair which was lost (off the southern end of 
Luzon Island) in December 1998, insurers commenced litigation against the 
defendant time charterers after the rights of the bill of lading holders were subrogated 
to them.377 The Tokyo District Court held the demise clause contained on the reverse 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
368 Satori, supra, fn. 366 
369 Margolis, supra, fn. 359, at p. 168. 
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372 Similarly in an Australian decision the New South Wales Court of Appeals held in an obiter dictum 
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side of the bill of lading to be ineffective.378 The court held that, the demise clause 
contravenes Art. 15.1 of the Japanese COGSA. (see footnote) as its intention is ‘...to 
discharge the defendant from liability as a carrier and it is a special agreement 
unfavourable to the consignor, consignee or the holder of the bill of lading....’379 The 
court saw no reason to refute the liability of the shipowner as he voluntarily assumed 
carrier’s liability.380 The effect being that both, the shipowner and the time charters 
are liable as carriers.381 The reasoning therefore was in sharp contrast to the 
reasoning in the case of the Jasmin. (see above) According to the court however, the 
case differed from the case of the Jasmin (where the shipowner was held to be the 
carrier) as the agent of the voyage charterer was independent from the time charterer 
involved ‘...and signed with with the wording FREIGHT PAID for and on behalf of the 
Master/Owner on the bill of lading.382 In the case of the Camfair some of the clauses 
on the reverse side of the bill of lading such as clause 13 stipulating that the 
defendant had a right to claim freight and have a lien on the cargo contradicted inter 
alia the demise clause. The court therefore held that the carrier could not be 
identified ‘...by these clauses alone....’383 The court placed weight on the 
consideration that the charterer has the right to claim freight under clause 13 which 
may exceed the time charter hire and ‘...substantially belongs to the defendant....’as 
the owner agreed not to claim the difference from the time charterer.384 The 
defendant charterer therefore was to be regarded carrier.385  
 
Conclusion 
We can therefore conclude, that the validity and role of demise and identity of carrier 
clauses as a means of identifying the carrier under Japanese law has not been finally 
decided as yet. 
 
2.2.4 Comments 
Commenting on the aforementioned decisions concerning the demise and identity of 
carrier clause respectively, Japanese scholars such as Satori assert that Japanese 
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judges and academics have moved away from ‘...actual shipping practice....’.386 
While it may be possible to identify the owner by the flag and a certificate of the 
vessels national registry or through the Lloyd’s Register of Shipping it cannot beyond 
doubt be established whether or not the vessel is demise387, time or voyage 
chartered.388 Furthermore, a shipper cannot be expected to investigate all the 
underlying relationships which are not available to the public.389 These relationships 
however, may bear some relevance for the shipper as shown above. He opts for an 
interpretation from the bill of lading holders perspective and proposes that where the 
name of the charterer is mentioned ‘...at the top of the bill of lading and the bill of 
lading is signed for the master by the charterers agent....’ the shipper may hold the 
charterer to be the carrier.390 Satori submits that when construing the bill of lading, 
special consideration should be paid to the intentions and the perspective of the 
parties involved.391 His approach therefore is quite similar to the one of the House of 
Lords in the Starsin where consideration was given only to the wording on the face of 
the bill of lading. Satori asserts that clauses intended to disfavour the shipper should 
not be enforceable due to the fact that they are unfair terms.392 He however does not 
hold demise clauses to be invalid in general.  
Commenting on the decision in the Jasmin Margolis points out that decisions where 
demise clauses were held to be ‘...entirely usual and ordinary....’ under English law 
(The Berkshire) should be seen in the legal context where an in rem action is 
available to the shipper.393  
 
Pejovic accords with the findings of the court in the case of the Jasmin He asserts 
that the identity of carrier clauses does not intend to lessen the carriers liability but 
rather to shift liability and is therefore not contrary to Art. 3(8) of the Hague Rules.394  
 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that even among courts in the same country, neither under 
Common law nor under Civil law jurisdictions, the problem of identifying the carrier 
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especially with regard to demise and identity of carrier clauses is solved in a uniform 
manner.  
The question therefore is, whether international attempts at standardising and 





I. Seatransport  
1. The 1978 Hamburg Rules 
Zambia was the twentieth country to ratify the Hamburg Rules in October 1991 which 
subsequently entered into force internationally in November 1992.395  
 
Art. 1 (1) reads: 
 
‘...“Carrier“ means any person by whom or in whose name a contact of 
carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper....’396 
 
The Hamburg Rules took a further step in recognizing the modern realities of 
shipping by widening its scope thereby introducing the concept of the “actual 
carrier”.397 
 
Art. 1 (2)  
‘...”Actual carrier” means any person to whom the performance of the 
carriage of the goods, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any 
other person to whom such performance has been entrusted....’398 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
394 Pejovic, supra, fn. 69, at p. 302 
395 Bassindale ‘The Identity of the Carrier under Bills of Lading’ at p. 7 
396 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) in Magnus Global Trade Law 
261. 
397 Charest, supra, fn. 13, at p. 907.  
The distinction between “carrier” and “actual carrier” as well as their joint and several liability is taken 
over from the Guadalajara Convention, 1961, art. 1; 2 which exemplifies a development in 
international transport law. See: Kienzle Die Haftung des Carrier und des Actual Carrier nach den 
Hamburg Regeln 6-7. 
398 Magnus, supra, fn. 396, at p. 261. 
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In consequence the carrier remains liable throughout the voyage whereas the actual 
carrier only bears responsibility for the part of the carriage which is performed by 
him.399 
One of the main consequence of art. 10 (1) combined with art. 10 (4) provide for a 
joint and several liability of both the carrier and the actual carrier where they are both 
liable400. 
 
Under Art. 15 (1) (c) the bill of lading must furthermore name the carrier and his place 
of business. 
 
Art. 23 (1) of the Hamburg Rules provides that: 
 
‘Any stipulation in a contract of carriage by sea, in a bill of lading, or in any 
other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is null and void 
to the extent that it derogates, directly or indirectly, from the provisions of 
this Convention. The nullity of such a stipulation does not affect the validity 
of the other provisions of the contract or document of which it forms a part. 
A clause assigning benefit or insurance of the goods in favour of the 
carrier, or any similar clause, is null and void. ‘ 
 
This provision by some is understood as rendering invalid demise and identity of 
carrier clauses in bills of lading as they purport to lessen the liability of the carrier 
under Art. 14 (2) and Art. 10 of the Hamburg Rules.401  
This approach however, is influenced by Canadian decisions in the scope of 
application of the Hague Rules where the courts held the identity of carrier clauses to 
be null and void.402  
 
Others assert that these clauses are systematically not contractual stipulations 
purporting to lessen the liability of the carrier under a mandatory regime but rather 
serve the purpose of identifying the carrier and therefore rather are a problem of 
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authority. The question who is liable under the bill of lading is not answered by the 
rules.403  
 
Still however, the Hamburg Rules improve the situation for cargo interest in case of 
suit. Firstly, as not only the party obligated under the bill of lading is liable but already 
the carrier with which the shipper has entered into a contract of carriage. Secondly 
because Art. 1 (1) introduces the principle of obviousness into the law of carriage by 
sea and thirdly because the shipowner will mostly be liable as an actual carrier under 
Art. 1 (1) of the Hamburg Rules.404 
 
We can therefore conclude that the Hamburg Rules do improve the situation of cargo 
interests in case of suit but arguably do not render invalid demise or identity of carrier 
clauses. 
It is further suggested that under art. 10 of the Hamburg Rules both the carrier as 
well as the actual carrier should be held liable jointly and severally for the entire 
carriage.405  
A major drawback to this convention is, that it has not been adopted by most of the 
worlds maritime nations such as the U.S. or England and the situation is unlikely to 
change in the future.406  
 
2. The 1991 Civil Code of the Netherlands 
Article 442 of Book 8 of the Civil Code of the Netherlands provides for a joint and 
several liability similar to the Hamburg Rules.407 Article 461 goes even further by 
stipulating that ‘...any person who signs a bill of lading, or whose form is used in 
issuing it, is deemed to be a carrier, and that a time or voyage charterer who is the 
last party in a chain of contracts will also be deemed to be a carrier....’408  
It may thus be concluded, that demise and identity of carrier clauses purporting to 
lessen liability of the broad definition of carrier under Dutch law, would be invalid 
stipulations.  
                                                          
403 Pejovic, supra, fn. 69, at p. 298.  
404 Kienzle Die Haftung des Carrier und des Actual Carrier nach den Hamburg Regeln 274. 
405 Sze Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules 31. 
406 Sturley The United States Commision on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: An 
Interim View of a Work in Progress (2003) 39 Texas International Law Journal 66. 
407 Tetley, supra, fn. 124, at p. 844. 
408 Ibid 
Identifying the carrier  Jens Weinmann 
 59
3. 1994 Nordic Maritime Code 
Although the Scandinavian countries have not ratified the Hamburg Rules parts of it 
were taken into account in the reformed Nordic Maritime Code of 1994.409 (Under the 
Code demise and identity of carrier clauses are null and void as it provides for a joint 
and several liability of charterer and shipowner.410 
 
4. The 1999 Draft United States Senate COGSA 
The proposal for a Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1999 as a replacement for the 
U.S. COGSA of 1936 provides for a broad definition of the term carrier comprising 
the “contracting carrier”, the “performing carrier”411 as well as the “ocean carrier” 
meaning a performing carrier owning, operating or chartering a ship used for the 
purpose of carriage of goods by sea.412 The notion of a joint and several liability as 
stipulated under the Nordic Maritime Code or the Hamburg Rules is not provided for 
in the Draft.413 
It may be concluded that demise and identity of carrier clauses would be rendered 
invalid.414 
 
5. The CMI UNCITRAL Draft 
Unlike the Hamburg Rules the Draft does not distinguish between the “actual carrier” 
and the “contracting carrier” and furthermore approves of the validity of demise and 
identity of carrier clauses.415  
 
5.1 Paris declaration 
During the CMI’s proceedings in Paris the question of the identity of carrier was 
raised. It was concluded that as a matter of construction a party merely performing 
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the carriage without being party to the contract of carriage could not be held liable 
under art. 1 (a) of the Hague/Visby Rules.416 
Following a comparison with the definition of the term carrier in other transport 
conventions such as Warsaw Convention (including the Guadalajara Convention 
suppementary to the Warsaw Convention, 1961), the Athens declaration and the 
Hamburg Rules the Comite Maritime International (CMI) recommended an 
amendment of the Hague/Visby Rules to allow cargo interests to sue the “performing” 
carrier thereby extending the scope of the Rules.417 
 
5.2 Singapore declaration 
Under the Singapore declaration, 2001 the term of the performing carrier is 
introduced.418 A contracting carrier carrying out the contract with his own means may 
be considered both a contracting as well as a performing carrier.419 It would appear 
thus, that this is the contrary situation to the Hamburg Rules where there can be no 
identity between carrier and actual carrier. This conclusion is derived from Art. 1 (2) 
of the Hamburg Rules where the actual carrier is a person or entity different and from 
the carrier.420 
 
6. The UCP 500. 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 500) which came 
into effect in 1994 inter alia deals with bills of lading in art. 23.421 It provides that the 
name of the carrier must appear on the face of the bill of lading.422 While the UCP 
500 is not a convention or given the force of law it certainly will have an impact on 
how bills of lading will be signed and issued423 especially as a result of the judgement 
of The Starsin. 
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II. Warsaw Convention 
While under the Warsaw Convention,1929 amended by the Hague Protocol 1955, as 
well as the Montreal Convention 1999, the term “carrier” is not defined, courts in the 
U.S. have ruled that entities performing functions of carrier such as baggage 
handlers or freight forwarders to be carriers under the Warsaw Convention.424  
The Guadalajara Convention, 1961425, supplementary to the Warsaw Convention 
under art. I (c) defines the actual carrier. 
 
The contracting carrier is defined as: 
 
‘...other than the contracting carrier, who, by virtue of authority from the 
contracting carrier, performs the whole or part of the carriage 
contemplated in paragraph (b) but who is not with respect to such part a 
successive carrier within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Such 
authority is presumed in the absence of proof of the contrary....’ 
 
The Convention therefore provides that passengers can either sue the 





The Hague and the Hague Visby Rules do not clearly specify who the carrier is under 
bills of lading. As it is the major convention enacted by maritime powers such as the 
U.S., GB. Japan and Germany the question is still not solved and without changes to 
the convention will continue to produce contradicting judgements in the future. 
 
The problem lies with the fact that the interpretation of The Hague Rules, especially 
when it comes to bills of lading and the effect and validity of demise and identity of 
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carrier clauses, is dominated by the idiosyncrasies of national jurisdictions, which do 
interpret the topic differently, and, with regard to the standard of unification of 
international law in this field are free to do so.427 
 
It is plain however, that the law of carriage, being truly international, needs uniformity.  
The only way to reach uniformity in international law is by way of a new convention 
which addresses this problem thereby leaving little space for interpretation through 
domestic laws. 
 
The way in this field is lead by the conventions on air transport. Although the situation 
differs from the carriage of goods by sea due to the more complex structure of 
charters in the later, the definition of the terms carrier may be interpreted in much the 
same way.  
Current initiatives in international law seem to point in this direction.  
 
The notion of a joint and several liability as laid down by the Hamburg Rules is to be 
incorporated in a new or the amendment of existing conventions.  
It appears that due to the complexity of the structure of, especially, time charters this 
would best serve the purpose of protecting cargo interests and leaving the charterer 
little room to escape liability. 
 
The current regime does not support the notion of a joint and several liability from a 
legal point of view. Arguably, the Hamburg Rules although weakening the effect of 
these clauses similarly do not invalidate them.  
 
A new convention or the amendment of an existing convention should therefore 
expressly invalidate demise and identity of carrier clauses in order to reach uniformity 
in the international law of carriage of goods by sea.  
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